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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PRESENTING THE STUDY 
Our military is postured globally to protect our citizens and interests, 
preserve regional stability, render humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief, and build the capacity of our partners to join with us in meeting 
security challenges. US forces will continue to defend the homeland, 
conduct global counterterrorism operations, assure allies, and deter 
aggression through forward presence and engagement.1  
– National Security Strategy, 2015
 
Security cooperation and security assistance have been around for as long as wars 
have been fought. Researchers may look back at the time during the Peloponnesian War 
when Athens decided to launch its ambitious Sicilian expedition with an end view of 
projecting power dominance over its long-time adversary, Sparta. From 414–413 BCE, a 
Spartan Commander named Gylippus provided effective military advising and assistance 
to the beleaguered Syracusans. The timely intervention of Gylippus resulted in the total 
defeat of the entire Athenian armada.2  
Today, the global security landscape changes with respect to diverse factors 
including, but not limited to, adaptive adversaries, culture, ideology, information 
revolution, power diffusion, religion, and technology.3 Therefore, civilized and 
democratic nation states must strengthen their bonds and security cooperation by 
conducting collaborative training exchanges to address current and future security 
challenges. The training activities then become a “conductor” or a quill pen to “connect 
                                                 
1 National Security Strategy, February 2015, 7–8, accessed March 6, 2015, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf. 
2 Martin Hammod, Thucydides: Peloponnesian War (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 365–414. 
3 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and 
Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 1; Adrian R Lewis, The American Culture of War: The History 
of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Enduring Freedom (New York, NY: Routledge, 
2012). 
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the dots”4 between training events and achieve the broader objectives and goals of 
security cooperation.  
The United States Government (USG) conducts security cooperation engagements 
globally with its Partner Nations (PN). Security cooperation engagements serve as 
parallel efforts to collectively and jointly address the global and transnational security 
challenges and problems posed by the enemies of peace. Among security cooperation 
programs, the Joint and Combined Exchange Training (JCET)5 is an excellent tool to 
achieve US security cooperation objectives. This study asserts that security cooperation 
engagements such as JCETs between the United States and its Partner Nations with 
shared goals and objectives, communicated throughout the training process, leads to the 
achievement of tactical and strategic goals for all nations involved. 
B. DESCRIPTION, IMPORTANCE, AND PURPOSE OF JCETS 
Under the umbrella of US security cooperation policy, JCETs fall specifically 
under the “other security cooperation education and training program,”6 which allows US 
Special Operations Force (SOF) elements to train with the Foreign Security Force (FSF)7 
elements in the PN’s home country. Although JCETs are primarily designed to support 
the training of US SOF teams abroad, PN security forces gain incidental training 
                                                 
4 Steve Jobs, in his speech to Stanford University graduate students, spoke about connecting the dots, 
which could be done by looking backwards but was impossible looking forward. According to Jobs, one 
must trust that the dots will connect to his or her future and trust on something like destiny, gut, life, and 
karma, among others. See video clip accessed on September 11, 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sr07uR75Qk0. 
5 Joint Combined Exchange Trainings, commonly known as JCETs, are activities specifically designed 
to support the sustainment training of U.S. Special Operation Forces (SOF) outside the continental United 
States of America. JCETs focus on developing the professional skills of SOF teams in order to build trust 
and relationship with the Foreign Security Forces (FSF) and at the same time enhance U.S. individual and 
team’s instructor competencies, advisory roles, language, and cultural awareness. Moreover, the FSF 
usually receives incidental training benefits, especially on individual and collective combat skills and 
capacity development. As stipulated in the Army Regulation 12–15, JCETs fall under the other training 
programs of security cooperation education and training program.  
6 Headquarters of the Army, Navy and Air Force, Army Regulation 12–15 SECNAVINST 4950.4B 
AFI 16–105, Security Assistance for International Logistics: Joint Security Cooperation Education and 
Training (Washington, DC: January 3, 2011), 1. 
7 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3–22: Army Support to Security Cooperation 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, January 2013)1–9. 
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benefits.8 This incidental training, compounded through continuous engagements, can 
have a substantial positive impact on PN security forces’ capacity to address both internal 
and external security demands.  
The fulfillment of strategic bilateral security cooperation engagements is 
consummated by the actual face-to-face interactions of both parties’ security force 
elements. Numerous security cooperation and Security Assistance (SA) programs are 
tailored to build partner nations’ capacity to overcome its internal and external security 
challenges in furtherance of achieving US strategic objectives.9 Considering the wide 
range of USG’s security cooperation activities and programs that are intended to support 
security and capacity building frameworks, JCETs are important bilateral training 
activities, which are expected to be continuously employed as a tool in developing the 
PN’s capacity to address traditional and nontraditional security concerns.  
This research broadly addresses the impact of JCETs on the operational security 
readiness of the US Special Operations Forces (SOF) and its allied counterparts. Using 
the US-PH relationship as an illustrative example, this study examines the processes of 
planning, coordination, execution, monitoring, after-action-reviews, and assessment, of 
conducting JCETs. This study further examines the relevance of JCETs in developing 
and sustaining the training requirements of US SOF and increasing the capacity of 
Philippine security forces elements to address internal and external security threats.10 
Very recently, a US House Armed Services Committee examined the security 
cooperation programs and activities of the Department of Defense (DOD) focusing on the 
causes of successful engagement outcomes. It was mentioned during the hearing that 
even with a small size force, US security cooperation with the Philippine government has 
been successful particularly in “containing the insurgencies in the Southern Islands of the 
                                                 
8 Headquarters of the Army, Navy and Air Force, Army Regulation 12–15 SECNAVINST 4950.4B 
AFI 16–105, Security Assistance for International Logistics: Joint Security Cooperation Education and 
Training (Washington, DC: January 3, 2011), 21. 
9 United States Joint Doctrine Note 1–13, Security Force Assistance, I-1 and I-2. 
10 Nick Turse, Secret Warfare: U.S. Special Forces Expand to Allies with Histories of Abuse (The 
Intercept) September 9, 2015, https://theintercept.com/2015/09/09/u-s-special-forces-expand-training-
allies-histories-abuse/?comments=1#comments. 
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Philippines.”11 In concert with this testimony, this study answers the question, “What are 
the metrics of successful security cooperation training engagements like JCETs?” 
Using the micro-level perspective, this study presents an evaluation design that 
will substantiate the success of security cooperation and training engagements like 
JCETs. This study also makes recommendations to improve the successful conduct of 
JCETs or security cooperation engagements in Philippines, the Pacific Command Theater 
of Security Operations, and other US military engagements worldwide. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As a global leader both in security cooperation and security assistance, the United 
States (US) Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) developed 
numerous program and activities, including but not limited to Security Force Assistance 
(SFA), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Security Assistance (SA), Internal Defense and 
Development (IDAD), and Security Sector Reform (SSR).12 SFA has the explicit purpose 
“to support the development of capability and capacity of foreign security forces (FSF) 
and supporting institutions.”13 Under the authority, guidance, and supervision of the 
DOD, SFA addresses both internal and external threats to stability, specifically tailored to 
the security aspects of security cooperation.14 In contrast, the FID encompasses the 
assistance with all “four elements of national power: diplomatic, information, military, 
and economic” (DIME).15 The DOS maintains overall responsibility for the FID, which 
focuses on internal threats of the Partner Nation (PN).  
                                                 
11 U.S. House Armed Services Committee, “Examining DOD Security Cooperation: How it Works 
and How it Doesn’t,” October 21, 2015, http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings-
display?ContentRecord_id=4163FB92-713B-41D6-97D4-519F56816475. 
12 Ibid. 
13 United States Joint Doctrine Note 1–13, Security Force Assistance, I-1. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Derek C. Jenkins, “Distinguishing between Security Force Assistance & Foreign Internal Defense: 
Determining A Doctrine Road-Ahead,” Small Wars Journal (2008). 
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Since JCETs are explicitly in the Security Cooperation-Other category (due to 
funding sources and their unique focus on training US forces),16 they do not fit into any 
of the more organized and well-understood programs. However, they most closely 
resemble SFA due to their incidental accomplishments of increasing PN’s ability to 
handle internal and external threats and JCETs are organized and conducted by the DOD 
with DOS support. Different sources categorize JCETs differently; for instance, the Joint 
Center for International Security Force Assistance incorrectly categorizes JCETs as SFA 
activities.17 This confusion in doctrine can lead to confusion within the executing forces. 
Figure 1 is derived from several sources and simplifies US security engagement programs 
in order to better understand the uniqueness of JCETs.  
Figure 1.  Diagram of Nested Security Cooperation Activities 
 
 
                                                 
16  Headquarters, Department of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, AR 12–15: Security Assistance and 
International Logistics Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training (Washington, D.C.: 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, January 3, 2011)1. 
17  Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, 
https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/about/sfa.aspx?ref=mainMenu (accessed November 16, 20115). 
 6 
There are a number of studies over the years that have addressed the issue of how 
to improve SFA, from the broader area of building partner capacity to the narrower focus 
of conducting effective and efficient training, advisory, and other engagements in shaping 
the future operating environment.18 The range of potential solutions differs in approach. 
One is the organizational approach. Bagiski et al. recommended the creation of a staff 
within the DOD to focus solely on SFA.19 As a slight variation, Wuestner recommended 
the creation of “Security Assistance and Advisory Command” in order to address the 
demands of the dynamic operating environment.20 Second is a doctrinal approach 
through the identification of the lessons learned for future efforts in SFA and the 
selection of potential advisors to adhere to the new SFA doctrine.21  
Other previously recommended solutions revolve around policy and strategic 
approaches in conducting SFA, which sought to analyze the effectiveness of SOF 
regional engagement and provide meaningful security assistance from the backseat 
standpoint.22 Recently, policy recommendations were sought to ensure the return of 
investment of US security cooperation and security assistance programs including 
consolidation, rationalization, and rebalancing of various Security Cooperation (SC) and 
Security Assistance (SA) authorities, undertake regional reviews of SC and SA programs, 
                                                 
18 Ross Meyer, SOF Regional Engagement: An Analysis of the Effectiveness of Current Attempts to 
Shape Future Battlefields (Monterey, CA: NPS Press, 2003), v; Theresa Baginski et al., A Comprehensive 
Approach to Improving U.S. Security Force Assistance Efforts (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 
United States Army War College, 2009), iv; Scott G Wuestner, Building Partner Capacity/Security Force 
Assistance: A New Structural Paradigm (Monterey, CA: NPS Press, 2009), 58–59; Jason A. Johnston and 
Stephen C. Taylor, Effective and Efficient Training and Advising in Pakistan (Monterey, CA: NPS Press, 
2010), 69–71; Sean R. Pirone, Security Force Assistance: Strategic, Advisory, and Partner Nation 
Considerations (Monterey, CA: NPS Press, 2010), 83–85; Terrence Kelly et al., Security Force Assistance 
in Afghanistan: Identifying Lessons for Future Efforts (Rand, Santa Monica, CA: Rand 2011), 116–118.  
19 Theresa Baginski et al., A Comprehensive Approach to Improving U.S. Security Force Assistance 
Efforts (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009). 
20 Scott G. Wuestner, Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance: A New Structural 
Paradigm (Monterey, CA: NPS Press, 2009), 58–59. 
21 Terrence Kelly et al., Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying Lessons for Future 
Efforts (Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA: Rand 2011), 116–118; Leslie Adrienne Payne and Jan 
Osburg, Levering Observation of Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan for Global Operations (Rand 
Corporation, Santa Monica, CA: Rand 2013), 31–32. 
22 Ross Meyer, SOF Regional Engagement: An Analysis of the Effectiveness of Current Attempts to 
Shape Future Battlefields (Monterey, CA: NPS Press, 2003), v; Johnston and Taylor, Effective and 
Efficient Training and Advising in Pakistan, 69–71. 
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increase regionally-focused SC and SA funds, enhance interagency coordination, refocus 
international military education training program, and develop a “systematic, interagency 
method of tracking outcomes.”23  
There are some missing ingredients to SFA that could also serve as determinants 
of its success if explored properly. One is culture, which is part of the social 
consideration variables. According to US Army Manual FM 3-22, culture is a “lens 
through which information is transmitted, processed, and understood.”24 Fully 
comprehending culture takes enormous time, knowledge, and understanding wherein 
most, if not all, SFA providers are constrained by time during engagements. The time 
constraint generally applies to both planning (time required to gain knowledge of a 
counterpart’s culture prior to engagement) and execution (time required to build rapport 
and gain a deeper understanding of a counterpart’s culture). Thus, longer JCETs are apt 
to have increased cultural awareness by both sides, leading to an increase in 
interoperability.  
Second is trust or distrust. Sztompka advanced a major work on social theory on 
trust as a fundamental component of human action.25 Kramer tackled the dynamics of 
distrust and suspicion quoting Grovier on the definition of distrust as a “lack of 
confidence in the other, a concern that the other may act so as to harm one, that he does 
not care about one’s welfare or intends to act harmfully, or is hostile.”26 Trust is a crucial 
component in building US relationships with a partner nation, while distrust upends the 
relationship of both parties.  
The duration of partnering (time) is a tangible element in terms of providing SFA 
and in building partnership with allied and cooperative states. The military is accustomed 
                                                 
23 Dafna H. Rand and Stephen Tankel, Security Cooperation and Assistance: Rethinking the Return on 
Investment, Center for New American Society, August 2015. 
24 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3–22: Army Support to Security Cooperation 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, January 2013), 3–6. 
25 Piotr Sztompka, Trust: A Social Theory (Cambridge, UK: The Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
x. 
26 Roderick M. Kramer, “Trust and Distrust in Organization: Emerging Perspectives, Enduring 
Actions,” Annu. Rev. Psychol. 1999, Vol 50, 587. 
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to making the best of time through “double-time” (speed up) and even to overtime (to 
cover up time of absence or meet urgent requirement). In so doing, it fails to consider the 
“ripeness of the moment.”27 Questions arise, however: When is the time to intervene and 
when is it not, or to provide support or not, or to advance or to withdraw? How and when 
would security cooperation engagements be laid out to produce favorable results? In light 
of these questions, it would be helpful to delve into the micro-level view of specific 
engagements to evaluate and perhaps make inferences and conclusions with respect to the 
possible outcome and future trends of security cooperation engagements, of which JCETs 
are worthy to be scrutinized. 
The JCET program came into the limelight when the US Congress approved the 
amendment of United States Code (USC) Title 10, which specifically included Section 
2011 authorizing the US “Special Operation Forces (SOF) training with foreign friendly 
forces.”28 USC Title 10, Section 2011 provided leverage for the US SOF to engage its 
allied partners and former foes at the end of the “Cold War,” with little or no civilian 
oversight, and likewise raised issues on human rights.29 The latter concern solidifies the 
Leahy Amendment that called for no training once a gross violation of human rights is 
reported against the foreign military forces.30 The call for civilian oversight and scrutiny 
of the JCET program paved the way for the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to 
release a report concerning the management and oversight of JCET in July 1999.31 
According to the GAO, there were discrepancies in the reporting of JCET activities, 
which could be attributed to the ambiguity on the term JCET itself. The report also 
                                                 
27 John Campbell, Successful Negotiation: Trieste (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1976), 73. 
28 United States Code Title 10 Section 2011, Special Operation Forces: Training with Friendly Foreign 
Forces, accessed September 11, 2015, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2010-
title10/pdf/USCODE-2010-title10-subtitleA-partIII-chap101-sec2011.pdf. 
29 William C. Story, Jr., CRS Report for Congress, Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and 
Human Rights: Background and Issues for Congress (CRS: The Library of Congress, January 26, 1999); 
Robert Thomasson, U.S. Military Trains Foreign Troops, The Washington Post, 1998, accessed September 
11, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/overseas/overseas1b.htm#TOP. 
30 Human Rights website, “Leahy Vetting: Law, Policy, Process,” April 15, 2013, accessed September 
11, 2015, http://www.humanrights.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/leahy-vetting-law-policy-and-
process.pdf. 
31 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Training: Management and Oversight of Joint 
Combined Exchange Training (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 1999). 
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pointed out the unclear relationship of JCET to counter-narcotics or counterterrorism 
lines of effort.  
The nature, scope, and definition of the JCET program are unclear in the DOD, 
joint, or armed service component’s manuals, and other publications. Obviously, JCETs 
fall under the broader spectrum of security cooperation. Can JCETs be categorized under 
SA, SFA, or the FID? The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance 
(JCISFA) is the only US entity that explicitly categorizes JCETs under the program of 
SFA.32 Under USC Title 10, JCETs are training opportunities for the US military to train 
in locations and with resources not typically available in the United States. More 
specifically, US Special Operations Forces (SOF) soldiers are able to work on improving 
their language and cultural skills, while training in varied environments with indigenous 
resources. As a byproduct, the training succeeds in increasing interoperability between 
nations, increasing the PN security forces’ defense of internal and external threats, and 
creating enduring relationships that may be useful in the future.33 Successful training of 
all parties involved is greatly increased in direct correlation to an increase in the level of 
cultural awareness, the quality of advisors, planning, flexibility, training venues, and 
invested time. 
D. APPROACH AND DESIGN 
This study asserts that US-PN JCETs, if constructed with shared goals and 
objectives that are communicated in a timely manner during the entire JCET process, will 
achieve the tactical and strategic goals of both nations. If this claim is true, then evidence 
of shared goals should exist in all of the following for each JCET: training concept, 
administrative procedures agreement (APA), after action reviews (AARs), post-training 
reports or after training reports (ATRs), and other documented reports. Although many of 
the previously listed documents are often classified, only relevant unclassified lines of the 
reports have been referenced in this study.  
                                                 
32 Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, What is Security Force Assistance, 
assessed September 11, 2015, https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/about/WhatIsSFA.aspx. 
33 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, AR 12–15: Security Assistance and 
International Logistics Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training, 21. 
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The core of this study’s analysis and evaluation of JCETs emerged as a result of 
combining the two training models. One is the Eight-Step Training Model. This is a 
modified training model that provides more emphasis on the last two steps of the training 
process: those that were sometimes taken for granted or not integrated in the training 
process (conducting a detailed AAR and retraining based on the AAR comments).34 The 
other model is the Analyze-Design-Develop-Implement-Evaluate (ADDIE)35 training 
process. This is a nonlinear training process in which evaluation and management cover a 
wide range of the process. This study emphasizes the facet of the ADDIE Model that 
focuses on improving training outcomes.  
By incorporating these two models, this study introduces the JCET Evaluation 
Framework (JEF) and proposes using the JEF to examine the effectiveness of the JCET 
program. The JEF (depicted in Figure 2) may further serve as a guide in the planning, 
conducting, and evaluating of future JCETs. Given the increasing security demands from 
US partner nations in conducting these activities to enhance their capability and capacity 
against domestic and international security threats, a better analytical framework is 
needed.  
                                                 
34 Matthew R. Little, The Eight-Step Training Model, accessed 21 September 2015, 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a560296.pdf. 
35 Donald Clark, History of ADDIE Model, created 13 July 1995, updated 6 September 2015, accessed 
on 28 September 2015, http://www.nwlink.com/~donclark/history_isd/addie.html. 
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Figure 2.  JCET Evaluation Framework (JEF) 
 
 
In this study, the main data used to analyze JCETs are AARs and ATRs or post-
training reports emanated from both PH and US units involved in the previous JCETs 
conducted in the Philippines. Additionally, when available, the APA, concept of 
operation (CONOPS) or training concept, the training calendar, and fund utilization 
reports complement the post-mission reports.  
The added value of testing this research design is that these AARs and ATRs 
originated from the national perspectives of the PH and US executing agencies. These 
perspectives are studied first in isolation, then in combination. In other words, our study 
looks at a sequence of JCETs conducted from 2011 to 2015 from each country’s 
viewpoint, comparing how reporting was done and what lessons might be drawn. These 
reports will confirm or negate the validity of our core concepts in determining the success 
of the conducted JCETs. For this particular study, success is defined as the byproduct of 
bilaterally agreed training objectives based on training needs, flexibility in JCET 
execution, institutionalization of the JCETs, shared commitment on the planned training 
support stipulated in the APA, and adherence to shared legal frameworks. On the outset, 
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it is expected that JCETs strengthens the bonds and cultivates a “culture of trust”36 
among the participants of both countries.  
This study examined and coded the main data (AARs and ATRs), which provided 
a descriptive and qualitative analysis of previously conducted JCETs. This study 
developed the evaluation criteria and JEF based on, but not limited to, unclassified higher 
US and PH policy documents; US Theater Campaign Plans; US Geographic Combatant 
Commander’s guidance, journals, articles, written papers related to US security 
cooperation; and the authors’ personal experiences in conducting JCETs.  
Due to constraints in data collection, this study is limited to PH-US Army-to-
Army JCETs that have been conducted during the last five years. This research closely 
examined the similarities and differences of the conducted training events, correct 
training audiences, training duration, and the degree to which JCETs were laid out to 
meet the training needs and capability gaps of both sides with deeper emphasis on the 
Philippine security forces. This study also looked at the extent of participation of the AFP 
training schools in JCETs and the resulting effects on their programs of instruction to 
institutionalize and maximize the training benefit from this type of bilateral engagement. 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION/STRUCTURE 
The study proceeds with a discussion of the legal framework of which JCETs and 
other security cooperation and security assistance programs and activities strictly abide. 
Chapter III reviews the Eight-Step Training Model and the ADDIE training process that 
laid the foundation for the conceptualization of the core concepts advanced in this study. 
These core concepts are the central focus of the analysis and evaluation of JCETs. In 
Chapter IV, the PH-US after action reviews (AARs) and after training reports (ATRs) are 
utilized as the main evidence to evaluate and analyze the conducted JCETs over the last 
five years between the United States and the PH. As part of the analysis, the authors 
examined the similarities and differences of conducted JCET AARs and whether the 
overall objectives of each country are aligned. Finally, Chapter V summarizes the 
                                                 
36 Anne Holohan, Networks of Democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 52. 
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findings, recommends key contributory factors for successful security cooperation 
programs and activities such as JCETs, and suggests the direction for future research.  
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II. PH-US ENGAGEMENT FRAMEWORK AND LEGALITIES 
A. BACKGROUND 
Every peaceful, state-to-state or nation-to-nation affair is governed and guided by 
laws, treaties, agreements, or memoranda of understanding among others. Therefore, it is 
relevant to know and understand the instrumentalities and legalities as well as the 
implications of these laws to the day-to-day activities conducted by the agencies and 
departments of both the Philippines and the United States. In essence, these frameworks 
of engagement are the baselines or reference points of policies and guidance that directly 
affect all engagement activities, be it in security or non-security sectors of both 
governments. JCETs must be understood as existing inside these accords. 
B. PH-US MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY 
The Philippines (PH) and the United States entered into an agreement called the 
Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) on August 30, 1951, in Washington, DC. This bilateral 
agreement was entered into force upon the ratification of the Philippine President, Elpidio 
Quirino, on August 27, 1952. The treaty, composed of eight articles, serves to strengthen 
the bond and relationship as well as specify the corresponding actions of both parties, 
particularly during times of external or imperialist aggression.37 
As an offshoot of the agreement, the PH-US Mutual Defense Board (MDB) was 
established on May 15, 1958,38 to oversee the implementation of the MDT. According to 
the Philippine Embassy in the United States, “The MDB provides continuing inter-
governmental machinery for direct liaison and consultation on military matters of mutual 
                                                 
37 Department of National Defense-Philippines, Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of the 
Philippines and the United States of America, August 30, 1951, accessed on June 11, 2015, 
http://www.gov.ph/1951/08/30/mutual-defense-treaty-between-the-republic-of-the-philippines-and-the-
united-states-of-america-august-30-1951/. 
38 Establishment of Mutual Defense Board between the Philippines and the United States, accessed on 





concern to develop and to improve both countries’ common defense.”39 Moreover, the 
Security Engagement Board (SEB) was established on April 11, 2006 and has been 
described by the US Department of State as a means “to provide a framework and 
mechanism for direct and continuing liaison and consultation to address nontraditional 
security concerns such as, but not limited to: terrorism, transnational crimes, maritime 
security and safety, natural and man-made disasters between the Philippine and United 
States authorities.”40 The SEB establishes priorities for PH-US engagements that deal 
with these specific concerns and strengthens the value of the MDT. All PH-US security 
cooperation activities (including JCETs) for the succeeding year are itemized in the 
MDB-SEB activity list. Respective countries’ representatives (U.S. Commander PACOM 
and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines) validate and sign the 
document during the yearly MDB-SEB Executive Committee Meeting conducted either 
in Manila, Philippines or Hawaii, USA.41  
Consider the PH MDB-SEB flow chart in Figure 3. It graphically depicts the 
processes in which the PH-US bilateral engagements and activities are crafted in 
collaboration with the respective units that conduct the activities and the functional staffs 
concerned who are responsible for providing the appropriate funding and support for the 
planned activities under the joint boards.  
                                                 
39 Philippine Embassy in the United States, PH-US Bilateral Relations, accessed on June 11, 2015, 
http://www.philippineembassy-usa.org/philippines-dc/embassy-dc/ph-us-bilateral-relations-dc/. 
40 Worldwide Web, State Government, PDF Document, accessed on June 11, 2015, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/83382.pdf. 
41 Major Emmanuel G Cabahug, “SOF Joint Combine Exchange Training from a Host Nation’s 
Perspective,” CTX Journal 5, no. 2, May 2015, https://globalecco.org/352. 
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The major services replicated the process with their respective counterparts as in 
the case of the current Philippine Army (PA) MDB-SEB bilateral engagement framework 
with US Army Pacific (USARPAC). Both the PA and USARPAC established the 
executive staff group (ESG) meeting where the PA commanding general and USARPAC 
commanding general approve the list of bilateral activities between the two armies. 
During the ESG meeting, representatives from Special Operation Command Pacific 
(SOCPAC), Hawaiian, and Guam Army National Guards are invited to incorporate their 
proposed activities such as JCETs into the overall list of bilateral activities, as depicted in 
Figure 4. 
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The MDT established the framework that would eventually lead “Balikatan”42 
02-1, also known as Operation Freedom Eagle,43 where the United States military began 
to directly support the Filipino counterinsurgency campaign in the southern Philippines. 
The Special Operations Command-Pacific (SOCPAC), as part of the larger US planning 
team, planned and conducted Balikatan 02-1 to train and equip AFP elite forces in 
preparation of future operations. The US forces were prevented from taking part in actual 
military operations, but provided training and logistical support to their Filipino 
counterparts.44 America had a vested interest in the capture and/or defeat of the terrorists 
and insurgents in the southern Philippines; the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), a notorious 
                                                 
42 Balikatan is the biggest Philippines-United States military-to-military bilateral exercise focusing on 
enhancing the interoperability and warfighting capability of both security forces in joint/combined ground, 
air, and sea operations. 
43 Operation Freedom Eagle: Balikatan 2002–1 (GlobalSecurity.org: Global Security). 
44 Timeline: Hostage Crisis in the Philippines (CNN.com/World: Cable News Network LP, August 25, 
2002). 
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terrorist organization, was known to be holding several American citizens hostage on the 
southern island of Basilan.45  
Balikatan has continued as an annual US-PH bilateral training exercise, with 2015 
as the largest exercise yet, incorporating over 11,000 American and Filipino 
participants.46 The training assistance and logistical support in the southern Philippines’ 
counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) fight continued under the umbrella 
of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Operation 
Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) was organized and conducted by a joint task 
force of US military special operators known as the Joint Special Operation Task Force-
Philippines (JSOTFP). JSOTFP deactivated on February 24, 2015 and was replaced with 
a smaller element known as a Forward Liaison Element (FLE).47 The FLE assumed the 
responsibilities previously held by the JSOTF. Liaison and Coordinating Elements 
(LCEs) are embedded in the Philippine Army CT unit to facilitate collaboration and 
coordination between SOF Teams providing CT trainings under the other US engagement 
initiatives. The FLE and LCEs are key factors in the successful planning, coordination, 
and execution of JCET activities in the different parts of the archipelago, with more 
efforts focused in the southern Philippines. 
C. PH-US MILITARY BASES AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
AGREEMENTS 
The agreement between the governments of the PH and United States that allowed 
the latter to maintain military bases in the Philippines was highly contested when both 
parties originally signed it in 1947.48 Manuel Quezon, Philippine Senate President at the 
time, stated that if the United States had “military reservations everywhere in the 
Philippines after independence would in effect nullify independence.”49 In spite of the 
                                                 
45 Ibid. 
46 Gina Harkins, Philippine Military Exercise Balikatan Reaffirms U.S.-Philippine Ties (Marine Corps 
Times, April 26, 2015). 
47 Julie S. Alipala, “US-Led Antiterror Unit Deactivated: American Role in PH War on Terrorism to 
Continue with ‘Smaller’ Group” (Philippine Daily Enquirer, February 26, 2015). 
48 Stephen R. Shalom, Securing the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement of 1947BCAS. 
49 Ibid. 
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opposition, the military bases agreement was signed by both countries in 1947 and 
granted USG the right to maintain 23 specified bases in the Philippines for a period of 99 
years.50 The term of the agreement was later amended to expire in 1991, at which time a 
renewal of the PH-US Military Bases Agreement was voted on by the Philippine Senate 
and not passed. By the end of 1992, the United States had turned over all U.S.-controlled 
military bases in the country to the Philippine government.  
Due to the cancellation of the PH-US Military Bases Agreement, US forces have 
not been able to establish US-owned bases, but have based military operations at AFP 
bases. This includes more than just training events such as JCETs and Balikatan events, 
but JSOTFP was also able to establish a base of operations on an AFP base. JSOTFP was 
able to control a section of the base that had been portioned off for US use.  
The PH-US Military Assistance Agreement, also signed by both countries in 1947 
and considered the sister agreement to the PH-US Military Bases Agreement, allowed for 
the creation of a Joint US Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) in the Philippines.51 
Although parts of the military assistance agreement have been modified over the years, 
the JUSMAG is still operating today with essentially the same mission as it was chartered 
with in 1947, including but not limited to “facilitate the logistical and training 
requirements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines for counter-insurgency/internal 
warfare.”52 JUSMAGPHIL continues to play a crucial role as the country’s Security 
Cooperation Office (SCO), a critical link between the Government of the Philippines and 
the US military’s Pacific Region Geographic Combatant Command (PACOM). 
JUSMAGPHIL coordinates all US engagements in the Philippines, including JCETs.  
D. PH-US VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT 
After the PH-US Military Bases Agreement failed to be extended, the PH-US 
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was drafted to protect the rights of US military 
                                                 
50 “US Military Bases & Assistance Agreements (1947)—Independence with Strings: From U.S. 
Colony to U.S. Neocolony.” The Filipino Mind, http://www.thefilipinomind.com/2012/10/us-military-




personnel while on temporary assignment to the Philippines. The VFA was ratified by the 
Philippine Senate in 1999 and allowed US military personnel to remain under the legal 
jurisdiction of the United States.53 Some Filipinos see this controversial agreement as 
consenting to US service members operating above the law and being free to commit 
crimes. This is not true, since most laws in the Philippines are similar to either US laws 
or the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Therefore, if a US service member is 
accused of a crime, he may not face trial in the Philippine courts, but he will be 
investigated and possibly prosecuted under US law. The VFA is designed to prevent 
erroneous allegations of military personnel and punishments that are deemed excessive in 
the United States.  
In the past, including quite recently, US members participating in various joint 
and combined exercises conducted in the Philippine territory have been accused of 
criminal infringements such as rape and murder.54 The leftist or anti-US groups capitalize 
on these cases and question the impartiality and constitutionality of the VFA. They 
recommend revocation of the said agreement because it appeared to be more favorable to 
the United States and violated the concept of sovereignty.55 As a consequence, PH-US 
bilateral relations are put into the limelight, which subsequently force both defense 
departments to impose heavy restrictions in the conduct of PH-US bilateral training 
exercises, including JCETs.  
E. PH-US MUTUAL LOGISTICS SUPPORT AGREEMENT 
In order to further facilitate the previously mentioned agreements, both countries 
signed the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) in 2002. The purpose of the 
MLSA is to, “further the interoperability, readiness, and effectiveness of respective 
                                                 
53 U.S. Department of State and Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, Agreement between the 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America 
regarding the Treatment of United States Armed Forces Visiting the Philippines, February 10, 1998). 
54 Carlos Conde, U.S. Marine Guilty in Philippine Rape Case, New York Times, December 4, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/04/world/asia/04cnd-philippines.html?_r=0; BBC News, Murder Trial 
for U.S. Marine Pemberton in Philippines, 23 March 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
32022445. 
55 Asia Pacific Daily, Case Against American Serviceman new Irritant to Philippine-US Relations, 16 
October 2014, http://en.apdnews.com/news/aae132ab404140ef8d56b457b040b39e.html. 
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military forces through increased logistic cooperation in accordance with the RP-US 
Mutual Defense Treaty, RP-US Visiting Forces Agreement or the RP-US Military 
Assistance Agreement.”56 There are exceptions to this agreement, such as nuclear and 
chemical ammunition, but overall, “each party shall exert its best efforts, consistent with 
national priorities, to satisfy requests from the other party under this agreement for 
logistic support, supplies, and services.”57 The terms of this agreement have changed 
over time. Initially, the transfer of guided missiles was expressly forbidden. However, in 
order to intensify COIN operations in the southern Philippine islands, guided missiles 
have recently been sold to the government of the Philippines.58 This agreement has 
continued and this year (FY 2015) the Republic of the Philippines is the seventh largest 
recipient in the US Department of State Foreign Military Financing Program.  
The MLSA is a “facilitation agreement for reciprocal provisions of logistics 
between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and US forces especially for the limited 
basing of US forces in the Philippines.”59 In effect, the MLSA shapes the support and 
logistical portion of JCETs. The logistical support is stipulated in the Administrative 
Procedures Agreement (APA). The APA is a nonbinding document that lays out the 
administrative and logistical support portion of JCETs.60 
F. PH-US ENHANCED DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT 
In 2014, the governments of the United States and the Philippines signed the PH-
US Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). On the surface, the EDCA 
                                                 
56 U.S. Department of Defense and Philippine Department of National Defense, Mutual Logistics 
Support Agreement (RP-US-01) between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and 
the Department of National Defense of the Republic of the Philippines, November 21, 2007). 
57 Ibid. 
58 1st Scout Ranger Regiment (Globalsecurity.org: Global Security, September 7, 2011). 
59 Paterno Reynato C. Padua, Republic of the Philippines-United States Defense Cooperation: 
Opportunities and Challenges, A Filipino Perspective (US Army War College Strategy Research Project: 





60 Cabahug, “SOF Joint Combine Exchange Training From a Host Nation’s Perspective.” 
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appears to be a modern version of the original PH-US Military Bases Agreement. The 
difference, which allowed approval by the PH government, is that the EDCA is “an 
executive agreement and not a formal treaty.”61 This allowed the executive branch of 
each country to agree to the terms without the approval of either nations’ senates. The 
agreement allows the US military to control and operate bases in the Philippines in 
“agreed locations” on a “rotational basis,” and the United States will not be able to store 
any nuclear weapons on the bases.62 The government of the Philippines will maintain 
ownership of the land that the bases reside on, and the agreement is valid for the next 10 
years.63 Recently, the media reported that the United States has expressed interest in at 
least eight locations in the Philippines, including former US bases Clark Air Base and the 
Naval Base at Subic Bay, two bases on Palawan, and two bases on Cebu.64  
Due to issues concerning the constitutionality of the EDCA, leftist and anti-US 
groups pushed for the abolition of this agreement. The matter is raised and currently 
under the judicial review of the Philippine Supreme Court.65 Although this agreement 
does not directly affect the conduct of JCETs today, its positive resolution will have a 
meaningful effect on the prepositioning and pre-deployment of US SOF in other areas 
where JCETs will be conducted in the future. 
G. LEAHY LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS VETTING  
The United States views the advancement of human rights as a necessity that 
complements promoting national self-determination in nation-states around the world. As 
a result of the US commitment to humane treatment of all people, the Leahy Law was 
                                                 
61 Carl Thayer, “Analyzing the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement,” The 
Diplomat (May 2, 2014), June 10, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/analyzing-the-us-philippines-
enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement/. 
62 U.S. Department of State and Philippine Department of National Defense, Agreement between the 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America on 
Enhanced Defense Cooperation, April 28, 2014. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Manuel Mogato, “United States Seeks Access to Philippine Bases as Part of Asia Pivot,” Reuters, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/25/us-philippines-usa-idUSKBN0NG05R20150425 (accessed June 
11, 2015). 
65 Ina Reformina, PH Supreme Court to Decide the Constitutionality of EDCA, 18 November 2014, 
http://www.balitangamerica.tv/ph-supreme-court-to-decide-constitutionality-of-edca/. 
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introduced in 1997 and has since been applied to all forms of security assistance and 
security cooperation activities. The Leahy Law restricts US assistance to individuals and 
organizations that have committed egregious violations of human rights.66 As a result, 
prior to committing funds, personnel, or equipment to enhance the capabilities of PNs, 
the US government must first conduct human rights vetting of the personnel or unit that 
are to receive training, money, or equipment. If individuals or units appear to have 
committed human rights violations in the past, they may still receive assistance if the 
Philippine military can show that “all necessary corrective steps have been taken”67 to 
prevent future heinous acts.  
Once accused of human rights violations, PNs may take a long time to prove that 
the necessary corrective steps have been taken to mitigate or resolve accusations 
pertaining to human rights. For example, Komando Pasukan Khusus (Kopassus), an 
Indonesian SOF, was accused of human rights violations. Several years passed before US 
SOF could reengage with them68 and US-Kopassus interactions are still a subject of 
debate.69 In the case of the Philippines, the AFP Scout Rangers were accused of human 
rights violations in 2006.70 This accusation temporarily hindered US bilateral trainings 
with their units who typically participated regularly in the PH-US Army-to-Army JCETs 
dubbed as Balance Pistons. As a result, the training pause created a considerable gap in 
building the capability and capacity of these known Philippine ground combat units. 
                                                 
66 United States Government Accountability Office, Human Rights: Additional Guidance, Monitoring, 
and Training could Improve Implementation of the Leahy Laws (Washington, D.C.: GAO, September, 
2013). 
67 Ibid. 
68 Charles “Ken” Comer, “Leahy in Indonesia: Damned if You do (and Even if You Don’t),” Asian 
Affairs: An American Review, no. 37 (November 26, 2010), 53–70. 
69 John M. Glionna, “U.S. Plan to Train Indonesian Elite Army Unit Raises Alarm,” Los Angeles 
Times, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/06/world/la-fg-indonesia-military6-2010apr06/2 (accessed 
November 12, 2015). 
70 Global Security.  1st Scout Ranger Regiment, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/philippines/1srr.htm (accessed September 24, 2015). 
Cabahug, “SOF Joint Combined Exchange Training from a Host Nation’s Perspective.”  
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H. SUMMARY/CONCLUSION 
With the increase in Chinese activity in Southeast Asia (SEA), the United States 
will heighten its engagements with regional PNs, especially the Republic of the 
Philippines. This increase in activity coincides with the US National Security Strategy’s 
planned “rebalance to Asia.”71 The newly signed PH-US Enhanced Defense Cooperation 
Agreement is indicative that the United States greatly wants to increase its presence in the 
region. As a result of the semi-permanent US presence that will ensue, the number of 
military to military engagements between the PH and the United States will likely 
continue to rise. With the increased numbers of engagements, and increased spending by 
both the United States and the Philippines, it is even more important to identify the 
factors of success that can be adapted to security cooperation engagements and ensure a 
high return on investment for both nations. In summary, JCETs will certainly continue to 
be a relevant SOF security cooperation engagement program that ensures active and 
continued military-to-military engagement that addresses both internal and external 
security threats of the Philippine government.  
71 Barrack H. Obama and National Security Council, “National Security Strategy 2010,” (2010) 24. 
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III. CONCEPTUAL DESIGN FOR EVALUATION OF JCETS 
A. BACKGROUND  
At the organizational level, US forces, including the SOF enterprise, are often 
viewed as overtasked, training in all human facets of war and performing “a wide variety 
of roles and functions.”72 These taskings are primarily due to the changing nature of the 
security environment and enduring security challenges posed by the enemies of peace, 
prompting high-security demands from allied and cooperative partners. With regards to 
the training perspective, several US security cooperation training programs and activities 
with its PNs are routinely conducted based on their importance and relevance to US 
national interest. Among those security cooperation engagement programs that possessed 
enduring return on training investments, the JCET program captures the center stage 
because of its dual dividends. One is the professional development of US SOF elements 
in mentoring, advisory roles, language, and cultural awareness. The other is the ability to 
shape or reshape the capacity and capability of its PNs security force elements to combat 
security threats, both internal and external. Since the Republic of the Philippines is the 
country of focus for this study, it is important to know the different JCET activities 
conducted in the Philippines each year. 
B. JCETS IN THE PHILIPPINES 
The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), in collaboration with SOCPAC, 
regularly conducts an average of 10 JCETs every year in the Philippines. The activities 
are included in the approved list of Security Engagement Board (SEB) activities 
deliberated during the previous year.73 The AFP Major Services SOF (Army, Air Force, 
and Navy) have their respective JCETs to facilitate. Moreover, the Philippine National 
Police (PNP) Special Action Force (SAF) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency 
                                                 
72 Christopher J. Lamb and David Tucker, United States Special Operations Forces (West Sussex, 
NY: Columbia University Press, 2007), 177; Thomas K. Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: 
The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare (New York, NY: Frank Cass, 1998), 288; Adrian R. Lewis, The 
American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Enduring 
Freedom (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 381. 
73 Cabahug, “SOF Joint Combine Exchange Training from a Host Nation’s Perspective.”  
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(PDEA) have their respective JCET activities, which are focused on addressing counter-
narcotics, law enforcement, and other objectives supportive of security sector reform 
initiatives.  
Having a solid understanding of the JCET activities that are conducted in the 
Philippines (See Appendix A), this study applies the derived core concepts from two 
important training models: the Eight-Step Training Model and the ADDIE Model. These 
two training models are discussed in detail in the following sections, including their 
relevance to JCETs. As mentioned earlier, with the constraints in data and time, this 
study focuses on the PH-US Army-to-Army JCETs. However, the results and implication 
of this study are potentially generalizable to other JCET activities as well as other 
bilateral PH-US related training programs conducted in the Philippines. Additionally, 
these findings may also be of use to other US bilateral relationships where security 
cooperation events are conducted. 
C. THE EIGHT-STEP TRAINING MODEL AND THE CONDUCT OF JCETS 
This study utilized the Eight-Step Training Model as the initial foundation to 
evaluate and assess the effectiveness of the JCET PH-US Army-to-Army activities 
conducted in the Philippines. This particular training model is used to emphasize the end 
segments of the training process, which are vital to the success of similar training events 
in the future. The Eight-Step Training Model comprises the following: “step 1 – plan the 
training, step 2 – train and certify leaders, step 3 – conduct a reconnaissance, step 4 – 
issue an order for the training, step 5 – rehearse, step 6 – execute, step 7 – conduct an 
after action review, and step 8 – retrain.”74  
In Step 1, preparation is the key to success. Planning the training such as JCETs 
needs a lot of preparation not only for the responsible training staff/coordinator but also 
for other functional staffs, in which training needs to be planned, coordinated, executed 
and evaluated. For example, in the case of the Philippine Army (PA), the PA training 
coordinator should ensure that the proposed list of bilateral training activities should be 
                                                 
74 Matthew R. Little, The Eight-Step Training Model, April 2012, 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a560296.pdf. 
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submitted to the international engagement officer who is responsible in incorporating all 
the proposed PA bilateral activities in the MDB-SEB list of activities (Figure 2). 
Moreover, the planning of JCETs should be coordinated with both participating units, 
considering the operational requirements of the HN and the US Geographic Combatant 
Command Theater Campaign Plan. On the one hand, the US SOF team, which planned 
the JCET, should be the one to execute the plan. This is to ensure continuity and achieve 
the objectives set forth by both parties. On the other hand, the HN planners should 
involve a representative or planner from the designated PA unit programmed to 
participate in the upcoming exercise. Doing this would entail that the training needs and 
demands of the participating units on the PA side is addressed. 
In Step 2, soldiers train to learn. Equally significant is for leaders and key 
noncommissioned officers to do the reverse, which is to learn how to train. Both 
imperatives are necessary conditions for a successful training program. As mentioned in 
the opening chapter, JCETs are primarily designed to support the training of US SOF in 
the foreign country that affords different terrain, more ground and air spaces, and 
importantly, a different culture. For this reason, the training may be geared toward 
enhancing the advisory or instructor roles of US SOF, as well as leader development and 
cultural understanding. Whether the United States dominates the instructor role or PH 
SOF instructs a portion of training, both sides would benefit from instructors (both 
United States and PH) having undergone prior certification in order to meet the 
bilaterally accepted (through signing the APA) training standards throughout the course 
of JCET instruction. 
In Step 3, just like any military operation, conducting reconnaissance is crucial to 
completion of the training plan. The training location, accessibility, and availability of 
training facilities, which includes live fire and impact areas, are some considerations that 
allow realistic training events. It is for this reason that pre-deployment site surveys are 
conducted during the initial planning of the JCETs. This is to make sure that the planned 
training events could be facilitated with respect to training considerations mentioned 
earlier. 
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In Step 4, issuance of training orders alerts subordinate units of upcoming training 
activities. For any other training programs such as JCETs, orders issuance allows the 
concerned participating units to execute their respective training plans based on the 
conducted initial and final coordinating conferences and the developed joint-combined 
training calendars and program of instruction.  
In Step 5, conducting rehearsals is an extremely important undertaking. A 
rehearsal is used as a meter-gauge to show how well units are prepared for assigned tasks. 
With constant practice or rehearsal, troops or units will gain confidence in achieving the 
unit’s mission. In the execution of JCETs, conducting rehearsals is foregone since more 
time is allotted to preparation and finalization of instructional packages and training 
POIs.  
Step 6 encompasses training execution. During this time, some degree of 
flexibility is required, especially on the training directorate in shifting the training based 
on the circumstances and availability or non-availability of the required training 
resources or equipment. During JCETs, training plans are especially diverted on the 
request and demand of the unit commander or training officer who did not have the 
chance to participate in the planning conferences. Another instance is the failure to 
provide the correct skillsets needed by the HN SOF participating units. Again, AARs or 
ATRs from both sides could validate or deny these issues. 
In Step 7, conduct of the AAR, both a formal (company level and up) and an 
informal (platoon level and below) review is crucial in the improvement process. This is 
done to reinforce the objectives of the training and understand how to better accomplish 
them. Leaders and soldiers need to understand and internalize discussed concepts for 
improvement to successfully execute future missions and further ensure future safety 
during similar training. During this step, unit or individual participants are given 
feedback on their actions on the given tasks. Corrections should be made to actions 
incongruent to the doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). However, if 
in the case there were actions which detracted from traditional doctrine and TTPs but 
achieved favorable outcomes, then those actions must be recognized and integrated for 
the development of new TTPs. During the conduct of JCETs, informal AARs are usually 
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conducted as positive or corrective steps to provide immediate feedback to the training 
participants. Recommendations should form an integral part of the AAR and post-JCET 
report to provide the planners from both sides the necessary inputs and points of 
reference for the succeeding JCETs. 
The eighth and final step revolves around retraining, and is time and resource 
dependent. Retraining allows a display of confidence and competency of the training 
within participants and concerned units. However, it may never happen after every JCET 
program since this task entails additional cost and extended time for both parties that are 
needed not only by other US SOF teams but also for HN SOF units in their respective 
sustainment training. Allowing more iteration of the training events within a given time 
frame could mitigate this if all considerations are satisfied. Depending on the eagerness, 
flexibility, and innovation of the unit leader, he could mitigate this concern especially by 
conducting follow on training during free time or while waiting for deployment. 
Therefore, this study considers retraining as the method of conducting a future JCETs, 
and implementing the lessons that were learned and discussed during previous AARs. 
Thus, the purpose of this step is to increase the effectiveness of future bilateral 
engagements.  
D. THE ADDIE MODEL AND ITS RELEVANCE TO JCETS 
This study complements the Eight-Step Training Model with the Analyze-Design-
Develop-Implement-Evaluate (ADDIE) model. The ADDIE model or process was 
introduced to the US Army in 1975 and became a dynamic training model in the mid 
‘80s. The ADDIE acronym was first used or accepted after two decades from its initial 
introduction to the US Army. At the turn of the twentieth century, it took off from merely 
being a process and was said to be effective in conjunction with other performance 
models.75 The 2011 US Army Manual coined the ADDIE model as “The Non-Linear 
ADDIE Model,” describing the model as a non-series process.76 Figure 5 is the diagram 
                                                 
75 Donald Clark, History of ADDIE Model, created July 13, 1995, updated September 6, 2015, 
accessed on September 28, 2015, http://www.nwlink.com/~donclark/history_isd/addie.html. 
76 Department of the Army, TRADOC Regulation 350–70: Army Learning and Policy Systems, 
accessed on September 28, 2015, http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/regs/TR350-70.pdf. 
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of this model as embraced by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC). 
Figure 5.  The Non-Linear ADDIE Model 
 
Source: Department of the Army, TRADOC Regulation 350–70: Army Learning and 
Policy Systems, accessed on September 28, 2015, http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/
regs/TR350-70.pdf. 
The ADDIE training process is pertinent to this study, as it captures the overall 
training life cycle. It is relevant to the conduct of JCETs since the phases of this model 
could influence the planning, execution, management, and evaluation of JCETs. 
Moreover, the same types of JCETs are conducted every year, which affords the 
opportunity to implement the necessary training adjustments. However, the ADDIE 
model also needs some refinement. It should include the integration of lessons learned 
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and new TTPs borne out of the previous training. Recommendations for future 
engagements should be integrated to prevent repetitive training events that would exhaust 
both the instructors and the participants. JCET training evaluations and assessments 
should integrate a more comprehensive analysis of the training exercise that would 
eventually result into more synchronized and synergized training activities, which further 
meet the expectations of both audiences (provider and receiver).  
In lieu of the Army Transformation Roadmap 2028, the Office of the Assistant 
Chief of Staff for Education and Training, OG8, Philippine Army adopted an effective 
system of integrating the core training imperatives of analyze, design, develop, 
implement, and evaluate in all PA training programs.77 The training programs 
incorporate PA units participating in bilateral/multilateral engagement trainings such as 
JCETs. The PA special operations command (SOCOM) has a high demand for the 
continuance of the JCET program because of the program’s impact on sustaining and 
enhancing individual and collective combat skills, and the proficiency of PA soldiers and 
front line units. Unfortunately, PA SOCOM and higher echelons of the AFP organization 
lack a grand strategy for utilizing JCETs as a tool of security cooperation engagement to 
optimize capacity or capability development of the Philippine SOF units. 
E. CORE TRAINING TASKS AND CONCEPTS 
This study develops the core training tasks and concepts based on the Eight-Step 
Training and ADDIE models essential for the training process: plan, execute, manage, 
and evaluate. Lacking any of these essential tasks in any training exercises or 
engagements such as JCETs would result in either a training fiasco at worst or a 
suboptimal training outcome at best. For example, if a certain type of JCET engagement 
lacks proper management and planning, the evidence would appear in the post-training 
reports or related documents mentioning such shortfalls or inefficacies. 
This study first identified what the key elements are in conducting combined 
training exercises like JCETs. This eventually led, through the use of the Eight-Step 
                                                 
77 Philippine Army website, OG8 Strategy Roadmap, accessed on September 28, 2015, 
http://www.army.mil.ph/Army_Sites/PAET/pdf/strategymap.pdf. 
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Training and ADDIE models, to the determination of five core concepts for JCET 
evaluation, which are illustrated in Figure 6. These core concepts are drawn from US 
security cooperation policy objectives, higher policies, legal frameworks, and our 
knowledge, experience, and understanding in the conduct of JCETs.  
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The first core concept concerns the agreed-upon training needs or required events. 
Prior to any JCETs, it is assumed that both sides understand and prioritize their respective 
training needs. For example in the case of US troops, the leadership would look more into 
enhancing their mentoring and instructor skills while sustaining their war fighting 
competencies. In short, US participants are looking to enhance their expertise in how to 
train indigenous forces. In contrast, Philippine soldiers typically aim to improve their 
mastery in basic warfighting skills. This may be due to frontline exigencies as the 
Philippine military is constantly confronted with various security challenges. Hence, 
warfighting skills are the much-needed expertise that enhances the level of confidence of 
the soldiers in combatting internal and external threats. The last element of this core 
concept evaluates the training duration and whether it was lengthy enough to accomplish 
the pre-established goals.  
The second core concept is flexibility in the execution of JCETs. No amount of 
preparation can ensure that things will go perfectly. In reality, changes will occur. 
Therefore, flexibility is a crucial ingredient to ensure that the training encompasses the 
correct tasks as initially planned or conceptualized, and having the ability to adapt to 
emergent training needs during the JCET as necessary. Overall quality of training, such 
as realistic training scenarios and culminating exercises (CULEXs), are also evaluated 
under this core concept. 
The third core concept evaluates shared bilateral commitment of training support. 
The conduct of training exercises and/or combat operations are functions of available 
resources for the tasks. It is the commitment of each party to provide the appropriate 
training support that allows a certain bilateral engagement to be conducted. For instance, 
during JCET pre-exercise planning conferences, the APA is crafted to provide the 
administrative and logistical support for the actual training exercise. If the support from 
either side conducting training is unfulfilled, a considerable impact results on the 
exercise. For example, non-availability or delay of rotary aircraft or the required transport 
vehicle during the infiltration or exfiltration of the CULEX could hamper the CULEX 
execution and affect the smooth flow of the training for the entire JCET. 
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The core concept of a shared legal framework allows both sides to conduct the 
same training. A legal framework that is unilaterally imposed by one party may result in 
some unintended training consequences. For instance, the strict implementation of the 
Leahy Vetting affects the conduct of JCETs. Though some measures could be taken by 
the PN to assist in clearing the military units for participation, the vetting is an arduous 
process that entails a considerable amount of time. Hence if strictly imposed, individuals 
and units are stripped of the opportunity to participate in the JCETs. 
Last is the institutionalization of JCETs. Every training engagement should be 
geared toward the transfer of learning from one partner, specifically individuals or units. 
In this regard, the military and doctrine centers are the crucial entities that ensure the 
continuity and direction of these bilateral exercises. JCETs can easily complement the 
local sustainment training conducted by the SOF units of both countries and assist PA 
SOF schools with developing the correct training package that advance individual and 
collective skills in wartime and peacetime contingency operations.   
F. SUMMARY/CONCLUSION 
The training process and models presented here have laid the groundwork of our 
analysis of JCETs. The Eight-Step Training Model was modified to accommodate and 
focus more on the steps that are usually not given equal attention—AAR and retrain. The 
ADDIE model provides a general framework for a training process, which was embraced 
by the US Army in the early ‘80s to enhance training outcomes. As a result of the 
combination of the two training models, this study conceptualizes the design for JCET 
evaluation. Specifically, this study developed the JCET Evaluation Framework (JEF) to 
objectively analyze and evaluate the success of the conducted JCETs.  
The core concepts for the JEF were selected from strategic policies, guidance, 
directives, and other mechanisms pursued by the United States and Philippines defense 
establishments, executing agencies, and geographic combatant commands. In developing 
the JEF, this study also infused the personal experiences of the authors in the conduct of 
JCETs. These concepts are validated through the use of AARs and ATRs of the 
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conducted PH-US Army-to-Army JCETs in the Philippines. The results and outcomes of 
the data analysis are explained in the next chapter. 
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE JEF AND OUTCOMES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The JEF is validated through the use of US and PH after action reviews (AARs), 
after training reports (ATRs), and post-training reports. Several documents including, but 
not limited to administrative procedures agreements (APAs), concept of operations 
(CONOPS) or training concept, training calendars and/or schedules, and available fund 
utilization documents complement the primary documents in conducting the descriptive 
analysis of PH-US Army-to-Army JCETs. This study researches post-training reports 
from 10 different US-PH JCETs conducted within the last five years; however, the 
analysis only represents data from eight of the 10 engagements.78 Table 1 summarizes 
the information that this study gathered for each JCET.  
Table 1.   JCET Post-Training Data Sources 
JCET  
Event* AAR/ATR APA Training Calendar Storyboard 
By Name 
Roster 
1 PH/US PH/US 
  
PH 
2 PH/US PH/US PH/US PH/US PH 
3 PH/US PH/US PH/US   
4 PH/US PH/US PH/US PH/US PH 
5 PH/US PH/US PH/US PH PH 
6 PH/US PH/US US US  
7 PH/US PH/US PH/US PH PH 
8 PH/US PH/US PH/US PH PH 
9 PH/US PH/US PH/US PH PH 
X US  US   
 *JCET Identification Numbers are generic for security purposes 
                                                 
78 Of these post-training reports, this study collected both PH and U.S. comments for all JCETs except 
one (Event X), which will not be referenced in this study since it only describes the U.S. viewpoint without 
a PH report for comparison. Also, JCET Event 9 was not referenced in the analysis since this event is the 
only Vector Balance report collected; it would need to be compared to other Vector Balances in order to 
properly analyze trends. Only unclassified sources and unclassified sections of classified documents are 
referenced in this thesis. All source reference information, including report titles and authors, has been 
sterilized in order to preserve the classification of the sources.  
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B. ANALYSIS/PROOF OF EVALUATION DESIGN FOR JCETS 
This study examined and compared the PH and US post-training reports utilizing 
the JEF’s core concept criteria for a detailed evaluation of the JCETs conducted over the 
last five years. A synopsis of the unclassified data collected is consolidated by JCET in 
Appendix B. The following charts and descriptions discuss the pertinent data after it has 
been scrutinized using the core concepts of the JEF.   
1. Agreed Training Events  
JCET training events are discussed during the pre-exercise planning 
conferences—initial planning conference (IPC) and final planning conference (FPC). 
Ideally, both parties should present respective training needs or training concepts during 
the IPC. However, recent practice is that the PH planners will present the CONOPS or 
training concept and the US planners provide comments or inputs on the training concept. 
Based on the post-training reports (see Figure 7), the majority of planned training events 
were conducted, and the United States dominated in the instructor roles of these training 










                                                 
79 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, AR 12–15: Security Assistance and 
International Logistics Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training, 21. 
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Once training events are agreed upon during the pre-exercise planning 
conferences (initial and final), representatives of both parties draft and sign the APA. 
These APAs are subject to change, and the attached training schedules are adjusted to 
accommodate the emergent needs of either unit. The post-training report of one recent 
JCET highlights this fact, noting that the APA was written and agreed upon on the AFP 
side by a G8 representative, not a representative from the actual unit to train.80 Once US 
SOF arrive for the JCET, the difference in perceived/planned versus actual required 
training is discussed between PH-US SOF units, and the training plan is altered to fit the 
emergent needs.81  
                                                 
80 Nicholas Ulrich (U) Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report (Department of Defense: 
Washington, D.C., 2011.) 4. This document is classified Secret. 
81 Ibid. 
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However, it is important to note that PA G8 staff members are not planning the 
activities or training events by themselves. They initiate communication to projected 
training units, commanders, and training/operations officers asking them what training 
events or training they need, the number of participants they can provide, and other 
requirements they need for the upcoming JCET. The G8 staff then consolidates and 
visualizes the proposed training concept based on the inputs submitted by the lower units. 
On the financial side, the G8 office also verifies that the requirements submitted are 
supportable based on the available or programmed funds for the JCETs—accordingly, the 
G8 office is the attesting signatory, because it can distinguish between supportable and 
unsupportable requirements.  
The post-exercise documents described the successful completion of a majority of 
planned training events. Also, several of the post-training reports mentioned those 
training events that were not planned, but requested during the actual conduct of JCET 
events, such as pistol marksmanship and communications training that were specifically 
requested by the hosting PA SOF unit commander.82 In one of the conducted JCETs, the 
PA SOF unit commander praised the US SOF training directorate on the latter’s ability to 
adjust the training schedule based on the PA SOF unit’s training demand, highlighting the 
successful conduct of the JCET.83  
On the contrary, unplanned training events such as Maritime Operations 
(MAROPS) and riverine operations were requested by the PA SOF unit but were not 
conducted.84 One of the PA Special Forces BN Commander requested a focus on 
MAROPS for his JCET, which was noted in the USSF post-initial planning report and 
planned as two days for MAROPs tactics and planning, three days for beach landing site 
surveys and scout swimming, and a day-and-a-half for a MAROPS infiltration practical 
                                                 
82 Joseph Reyes (U) Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report (Department of National Defense: 
Republic of the Philippines, 2013) 2. This document is classified Secret.  
83 Ibid. 
84 Kevin Ocampo (U) Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report (Department of National Defense: 
Republic of the Philippines, 2013) 2. This document is classified Secret. 
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exercise.85 However, the actual training during the JCET focused on combat 
marksmanship, devoting only a partial day to a MAROPs lecture.86 With the post-
training reports written as they are, it is difficult to ascertain where the disconnect 
occurred and why the initially agreed-upon training was altered. It is possible that the 
USSF team scheduled for that particular JCET lacks the expertise in the actual conduct of 
MAROPS. 
PH ATRs mention that most of training events were completed during the training 
dates of JCETs. Accordingly, US SOF rarely request for additional training since they are 
enhancing cross training within their own team simply by instructing AFP participants. In 
some instances, training events were shortened to accommodate emerging training needs 
or demands from PH participating units. Moreover, there was an instance where the 
training duration was shortened due to effects of weather. While enroute to the 
Philippines, the US SOF team was stranded in Japan due to a strong typhoon that entered 
the Philippine area of responsibility. This typhoon incident caused the postponement of 
the exercise for more than two weeks. Thus, the JCET that was initially planned for a 
month was reduced to only 12 days. As a consequence, all training events and instruction 
were compressed and some were even cancelled.87 
Overall, US post-training reports mention that the majority of the training events 
planned during the pre-exercise planning activities (IPC and FPC) were conducted during 
the actual JCETs. In the data studied, an average of two unplanned training events were 
added to the schedules and conducted during the training exercises. Commanders and/or 
operation officers specifically requested these training events to complement the unit’s 
individual and collective skills enhancement training. Examples of such training events 
are pistol marksmanship and mission planning. Moreover, most US SOF teams 
recommended for the extensive focus on Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) or 
medical training instead of Small Unit Tactics (SUT). The lack of knowledge and 
                                                 
85 Travis Milgrim (U) Balance Piston XX-X Post Initial Planning Report (Department of Defense: 
Washington, D.C., 2013.) 4. This document is classified Secret. 
86 Ocampo (U) Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report, 2. 
87 Ian Santos (U) Balance Piston XX-X After Activity Report (Department of National Defense: 
Republic of the Philippines, 2011) 7. This document is classified Secret.  
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expertise in TCCC has been identified as reoccurring and preventable cause of fatalities 
of Filipino soldiers in the frontline. 
2. Flexibility in Execution  
Sometimes training schedules need to be adjusted due to unplanned 
circumstances. In the case of one JCET, the planned training was downgraded to a lower 
level, which limited the overall training goals. This was due to the SR participants (who 
according to the APA were supposed to be an SR-qualified cohesive company) that 
participated as a composite unit of which 25% were not even SR qualified.88 The PH 
ATR for this same JCET denotes that the training schedule was changed many times due 
to the delayed arrival of the USSF team, which impacted the POI and the smooth flow of 
the training.89 The PH ATR further states that the training was rushed in an effort to 
achieve the initial agreed-upon training, but with only half of the planned duration.90 
Realistic training events were visible in almost all post-training reports (see 
Figure 8) that this study has access to. Five out of eight JCETs executed training events 
considered to be quality CULEXs. Of the remaining three JCETs, one PA SF BN 
commander canceled the planned CULEX due to perceived issues associated with the 
conduct of CULEX that involved local populace in the impact areas.91 The consistent 
high demand for CULEX events is directly indicative of their perceived training value by 
both nations. However, neither the United States nor the AFP reports seem to truly 
capture what about the CULEXs made them successful or how to improve upon them for 
future training.  
                                                 
88 Joshua Rhodes (U) Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of 
Defense, 2011) 8. This document is classified Secret. 
89 Santos (U) Balance Piston XX-X After Activity Report, 7. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Reyes (U) Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report, 2. 
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US post-training reports fail to describe the training that was planned, but not 
executed. That information is solely derived from the PH ATRs. This is perhaps because 
the format of the US reports does not include a section where these comments should be 
annotated. It is important to note these differences between intended and actual training 
in order to educate and prepare future planners for similar exercises, thus preventing the 
continual process of relearning the same issues.   
3. Shared Bilateral Training/Logistical Support 
Money is a necessity for all engagements and a key factor that contributes to the 
success of a given engagements like JCETs. The commitment to provide the appropriate 
training support is clearly manifested in the provisions of the APA. The availability of 
training and billeting facilities, exercise area, weapons, ammunition, fuel, air and ground 
transport vehicles are predictive of a successful JCET. Of course, the timely delivery and 
availability of this bilaterally agreed training and logistic support is another consideration 
for uninterrupted flow of bilateral training. Figure 9 summarizes the US-PH reports and 
each nation’s concerns regarding logistical support during JCETs. 
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Figure 9.  Descriptive Comparison of PH and US AARs/ATRs (Shared 
Bilateral Training/Logistical Support) 
 
 
Most of PH SOF ATRs mention numerous problems and challenges in the areas 
of logistic system or sustainment operations. PH participating units repeatedly raised 
issues and concerns pertaining to defective rifles, mismatched U.S.-provided 
ammunition, lack of PA riverine or maritime assets, and non-availability of rotary and 
ground transportation vehicles during the FTX or CULEX. The unresponsiveness of the 
PH logistic support system is the culprit of these challenges; hence the PA pushed for the 
capability upgrades in terms of firearms and other much-needed ground assets. On a 
positive note, the PH Defense Department and the AFP have intensely strengthened their 
effort to modernize and professionalize the force. New rifles are now issued to the line 
units to raise the morale of the soldiers in the frontline.92 Post-training reports also 
mention that the United States provided a sufficient amount of POL, ammunition, and 
incidental repair of training facilities that transpired as a result of the conducted JCET.  
                                                 
92 Maxdefense, http://maxdefense.blogspot.com/2013/12/3-projects-to-modernize-assault-rifle.html 
(accessed November 16, 2015). 
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Post-exercise report of US SOF cited that the main cause of training pause during 
JCETs was due to defective firearms issued to the participants. One JCET post-training 
document mentioned that instead of providing or focusing on developing the required 
skillset like basic rifle marksmanship, the activity was focused first in fixing or 
maintenance check of individual firearms.93 Again, this suggests a less than desirable 
training outcome for a specific training event. US SOF listed other examples of resources 
not procured between the planning conference and execution time. During a CT-focused 
JCET, the training location did not have a CQB training facility that was both useable and 
safe.94 That same event also fielded post-engagement report comments regarding 
inadequate hygiene facilities; the report listed two functional toilets to support 60 
personnel for the duration.95  
Between the US and PH after activity reports, gaps exists between how each side 
views their capabilities. Four out of 10 US reports describe the need for an increase in 
Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) medical training. One report even recommends 
assembling a continuous TCCC mobile training program that would continuously engage 
PH SOF units.96 During a different JCET, the US post-engagement report states that US 
SOF extended TCCC training by three days in order to increase the participants’ 
knowledge of this critical skill.97 However, only one out of nine AFP ATRs mentions the 
importance of increasing knowledge of TCCC.98 This same disconnect is evident in the 
reports when discussing the need for increased planning capabilities. None of the AFP 
reports indicate a need to adjust planning methods or increase the capability. However, 
four out of 10 US reports describe a need to increase the PH SOF’s planning capability at 
battalion level and below. This may be due to a cultural difference and the US military’s 
                                                 
93 Christopher Raabe (U) Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report (Department of Defense: 
Washington, D.C., 2013.) 7–8. This document is classified Secret.  
94 Daniel Smiley (U) Vector Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report (Department of Defense: 
Washington, D.C.,, 2014) 5. This document is classified Secret.  
95 Ibid. 
96 Jason Pacquin (U) Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report (Department of Defense: 
Washington, D.C., 2012) 6. This document is classified Secret.  
97 Ulrich (U) Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report, 4–5. 
98 Santos (U) Balance Piston XX-X After Activity Report, 8. 
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need to always use a standardized planning process known as the military decision-
making process (MDMP). If the two sides would openly and candidly share AAR 
comments and recommendations, the views on the importance of TCCC and MDMP 
could be addressed. 
4. Shared Legal Frameworks  
Legal frameworks guide the conduct of security cooperation program and 
activities such as JCETs. Since most of the JCETs are conducted inside AFP installations, 
camp rules, regulations, and cultural awareness are lectured during the opening phase of 
the JCETs. In adherence to the Leahy Law, a human rights seminar is typically conducted 
immediately following the opening ceremony to prevent human right violations during 
and after the exercise. Under the supervision of the SEB, JCETs may address 
nontraditional security concerns, including, but not limited to counterterrorism, counter-
narcotics, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief, among others. Figure 10 
summarized the trends from the US-PH reports in relation to legalities. 
 49 




PH SOF ATRs seldom cite legal mechanisms except for the unintended effect of 
the Leahy Amendment to the regular units participating in the JCETs. As mentioned in 
the preceding sections, there were instances that less than half of the number of the 
originally planned PA participants were accommodated in the JCET even if there were 
available alternate soldiers who were supposed to fill the vacated positions. Moreover, 
the leftist group filed HR complaints against the Philippine SR regiment, which deny the 
entire unit to participate in the JCETs for several years.99 It was only recently that the 
unit was cleared and rejoined the JCET program.  
Furthermore, the AFP institutionalized human rights training in every professional 
military education course POI. This makes the US SOF led human rights training during 
                                                 
99 Cabahug, “SOF Joint Combine Exchange Training from a Host Nation’s Perspective.”  
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the opening day of JCETs antiquated. Training time that has been spent on human rights 
training could be spent on other events that are more relevant to the agreed-upon training. 
However, the discussion of human rights at the start of a JCET ensures a common 
understanding of internationally recognized human rights among all participants.  
5. Institutionalization of JCET 
In order to maximize the enduring results of JCETs, the proper participants should 
be involved. Certified trainers in a PA SOF school program would be able to directly 
impart newly honed skills into the next generation of Filipino SOF soldiers. Therefore, 
incorporating PH SOF school instructors into JCETs could maximize this important 
cultivating benefit. Also, these PH SOF instructors should be previously certified in the 
topics that will be focused on during the JCET. This baseline knowledge will not only 
assist in the two-way transfer of information with US counterparts, but will also provide a 
foundation that can be built upon during the JCET training. If fundamentals are already 
understood, more advanced skills can be exchanged throughout the event. In the future, 
post-training reports should be exchanged between participating units in order to provide 
an honest assessment that will provide each unit the information to build upon for future 
JCETs. 
Recent PH ATRs pointed out the importance of including planners from the 
schoolhouses during JCET pre-exercise planning conferences to contribute in the 
development of the training POIs.100 Unfortunately, the PA SOCOM and PA training 
division failed to include them during the coordinating conferences.101 A majority of 
conducted JCETs do not include participants from SOF training schools (see Figure 11). 
As a result, the acquired learning only goes to the units who participated in the JCET. For 
this reason, US SOF recommended that train-the-trainer events should immediately 
follow JCETs in order for AFP JCET attendees to effectively spread their newly gained 
                                                 
100 Rodrigo Torres (U) Vector Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report (Department of National 
Defense: Republic of the Philippines, 2014) 4. This document is classified Secret.  
101 Harold Shirley (U) Administrative Procedures Agreement between Company X, X Battalion, X 
Special Forces Group and Special Operations Command, Philippine Army (Department of Defense: 
Washington, D.C., 2014). This document is classified FOUO. 
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knowledge to the PA SOCOM force.102 Effective transfer of expertise is done if 
instructors have the right skills and motivation to teach. The projected instructors should 
have learned beforehand how to train; hence, certifying instructors is a better way to 
ensure uniformity in teaching design, approach, or methodology.  
Figure 11.  Descriptive Comparison of PH and US AARs/ATRs 
(Institutionalization of JCET) 
 
 
The collected PH ATRs do not mention AFP instructor certification. This area 
needs to be considered in future JCET engagements. Additionally, the exchange of 
lessons learned and TTPs were merely anecdotal and do not specifically describe what 
lessons have been learned or what TTPs have been exchanged. All of the PH and US 
ATRs mentioned the sharing of lessons learned and exchanging TTPs, but no evidence 
directly supports that the sharing and exchanges actually happened. If this is true then 
                                                 
102 Dustin Smith (U) Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Photos and Synopsis (Department of 
Defense: Washington, D.C., 2012). This document is classified Secret. 
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everyone should be proficient in the JCET training events, which are basically repetitive 
in nature considering the number of JCETs that have been conducted all over the 
Philippine Archipelago.  
Looking at US post-exercise reports, there are some instances during early JCETs 
where US planners tried to involve PA SOCOM schools, but this effort yielded results 
that were lower than the expectations of the participants. The intent was for the USSOF 
team to train together with the PA SOCOM school instructors, followed by assisting 
those same instructors with training a PA SF line company. Several PA SOCOM school 
instructors did indeed participate in the training; however, not enough attended to 
properly train the SF Company.103 Just like the Filipino instructors, US SOF elements do 
not have formal instructor certification. Most ODAs conduct internal training and 
instructor certification of the classes to be taught, prior to deployment. Junior operators 
are typically paired with more senior operators in an effort to pass along JCET lessons 
learned. In addition, ODAs currently assign operators specific skills to instruct that 
correlate to their military schooling and certifications. For example, a US SOF operator 
will not lead the instruction of a sniper POI unless he himself is Special Forces Sniper 
qualified.  
The primary benefit for USSOF team members during JCETs is to develop their 
instructor and mentoring skills. This leads to a general assumption that US troops are 
more knowledgeable in most of the training events than their Filipino counterparts. 
However, there are some events that PA SF and SR units are more knowledgeable in than 
their US counterparts, especially in jungle operations, riverine operations, small unit 
tactics, and civil-military operations, because of the PA SF and SR units’ greater training 
access, knowledge, and operational experiences in the field.104 These are the training 
events where USSF gains most of the tactical returns out of U.S.-sponsored JCETs. 
                                                 
103 Glen Miller (U) Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report (Department of Defense: Washington, 
D.C., 2013) 4. This document is classified Secret.  
104 Eduardo Pagan (U) Balance Piston XX-X After Activity Report (Department of National Defense: 
Republic of the Philippines, 2012) 2–4. This Document is classified Secret.  
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C. SUMMARY/CONCLUSION 
This framework highlights several existing trends. Training schedules are often 
flexible and allow the units on the ground to discuss their needs and circumstances that 
may have changed since the IPC and/or FPC. Also, delays in travel plans can directly 
lead to significant training plan alterations. In order for training to still be successful, a 
free line of communication between participating units is mandatory.  
For newly trained skills to propagate among other units that are not participating 
in the actual JCETs, either a train-the-trainer program should be established, or cadre 
from the PA SOCOM schools should participate in the training. Instead of losing the 
valuable insights and TTPs shared, these ideas could be propagated through the force. In 
addition, training quality rises if the units participating are homogenous units with 
standing SOPs and a high level of combined unit training. A certification process could 
ensure that participants are at a high enough level of training to both share and receive 
relevant TTPs.  
The misalignment of the training needs and desires should be mitigated at the 
onset of the JCET process. The prioritization of the unit commander on the skill sets that 
his unit needs should be the primordial basis for training. In the future, there is potential 
value if observers from other SOF units could provide constructive criticism and a candid 
training evaluation. In the case of JCETs, constructive criticism should be a two-way 
street. It is imperative that both PH-US SOF units look into a way to accomplish a 
bilaterally agreed post-exercise report format and exchange these reports as a method to 
improve succeeding JCETs. In this study, only two of the eight exercises reported the 
conduct of a combined AAR at the conclusion of the respective JCETs.105  
  
                                                 
105 Andrew McDougal (U) PH-US Balance Piston XX-X Combined Post Training Report (Department 
of Defense: Washington, D.C.,  2013). This document is classified FOUO. 
Mark Cruz (U) Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report (Department of National Defense: 
Republic of the Philippines, 2014). This document is classified Secret. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY AND FINDINGS 
Systematically evaluating or assessing the effectiveness of a certain training 
program like JCETs is a difficult task to undertake, especially with constraints in data and 
time. Perhaps this study would have been more precise if more data were available for 
examination and coupled with surveys and interviews with the PH and US security 
cooperation planners; subject matter experts; and unit commanders, staffs, and 
participants involved with the conducted JCETs. However, even with these limitations, it 
is worth noting that this study is relevant in the future conduct of JCETs and related 
programs and activities of security cooperation.  
From the time of the JCET program’s inception, there is no evidence that a 
deliberate effort has been attempted to evaluate JCET effectiveness. One partial 
exemption is a USG GAO report in 1999.106 The report recommends civilian oversight of 
security cooperation activities, particularly those that could be categorized or fall at the 
boundaries of security force assistance in which the JCET program fundamentally fits in. 
The Leahy Amendment resulted, which supposedly strengthened the grip of the DOS on 
the security assistance engagements provided to PNs executed by the DOD. More often 
than not, there has been a collision between achieving the broad US national interest 
against current security demands of PNs. When this happens, current security demands in 
US regional combatant commands upend or circumnavigate existing legalities such as the 
Leahy Vetting. Interestingly, a number of countries that allegedly have violated human 
rights continued to receive US training assistance under the guise of JCETs in the same 
time frame as this study.107  
Moreover, several publications mention the successful conduct of JCETs, but 
these accounts are only anecdotal. No evidence yet has been marshaled to support the 
claim that an executed JCET was successful based on any measure of objective analysis. 
                                                 
106 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Training: Management and Oversight of Joint 
Combined Exchange Training (Washington: D.C., July 23, 1999). 
107 Nick Turse, “Secret Warfare.” 
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Of course, one would tend to first ask what constitutes a successful JCET? Thus, this 
study defined success as the byproduct of bilaterally-agreed training events and 
objectives based on training needs, the bilateral flexibility in JCET execution, shared 
commitment on the planned training support stipulated in the APA, adherence to shared 
legal frameworks, and the institutionalization of the JCETs.  
This study focused on the micro-level assessment of JCETs conducted in the 
Philippines, especially the PH-US Army-to-Army JCETs utilizing available AARs, 
ATRs, and post-training reports of the same JCETs from both sides complemented with 
APAs, CONOPS, a training calendar, and fund utilization reports. The evaluation criteria 
were based on higher policy documents, commander’s intent, and the experiences of the 
authors in the conduct of these JCETs. 
Not all AARs and ATRs are perfectly reliable data sources. There may be some 
diplomatic constructive comments in the articulation of these reports that possibly made 
them more subjective than objective. Taking into account the respective culture, this 
study assumes that the AARs and ATRs used in this analysis are somewhat neutral in 
their comments to minimize their offensive nature, which may affect the broader 
objectives of security cooperation. However, even with subdued comments, this research 
divulges common trends with regard to substantial factors or elements that may serve as 
determinants of success in the planning and evaluation of JCETs.  
As it turned out, the Filipino post-exercise reports or ATRs were more detailed, 
and focused more on the conduct of the JCET itself, than were the US reports. PH SOF 
AARs and ATRs include the list of both PA and US participants of the JCETs, the 
training calendars and daily training schedule, comments, observations, and 
recommendations for the next JCETs. On the other hand, US post-training reports 
focused more on the logistical portion and other factors such as weather effects and 
descriptive summary of entry and movement through the country with equipment. US 
Special Operation Force (SOF) post-training reports do not include the names of the US 
participants or main planner of the JCET in which the succeeding US SOF Team could 
collaborate or leverage to sustain and improve portions of the previously conducted 
JCET.  
 57 
The Administrative Procedures Agreement (APA) is the driving document for the 
common JCET event. It specifically stipulates the administrative and logistical support 
that should be provided by both armies in the exercise. On the one hand, the PA is 
usually responsible for making available the training venue or exercise area, training 
facilities, billeting of all participants including USSOF, transportation, and other 
requirements of the JCET. The United States, in turn, is usually responsible for providing 
the training package, training POL and ammunition, limited medical supplies, food and 
water for US SOF, incidental repairs, aircraft, and base clearance request, among others. 
Moreover, JUSMAG-Phil facilitates base access and Human Rights Vetting (HRV) 
procedure (90 days prior to the exercise). With the long HRV process and the operational 
demands on the battlefield, PH SOF participants who were supposed to participate in the 
exercise were committed to combat operations during the actual JCET training dates. As 
such, the PH participants were trimmed down by almost half of the original training 
participants. There were training fillers on the PH side, but they were not allowed to 
participate in the training because they were not vetted early. As a consequence, the 
bilateral exercise was not maximized, considering the amount of resources and efforts 
poured in for the JCET to make it happen. Again, the unintended consequences of the 
Leahy Vetting resulted in a suboptimal training outcome, as evident on some instances 
that fewer troops participated in the exercise. 
Beside the fact that there is no bilateral strategy for utilizing JCETs as a means to 
enhance and capacitate the Philippine security force elements, this study additionally 
found no exchange of unilaterally-written AARs or ATRs from either PH or US 
participating units. It is worth noting that part of the objectives of every JCET is to learn 
and exchange tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in whatever skillsets that both 
parties are trying to achieve. However, without providing feedback on the results and 
outcomes of the conducted JCETs, it appears that JCETs are repetitive in the way that 
training events and objectives are conceptualized without looking for its strategic 
relevance and long-term goals. The issues and concerns in the reports are recurring, 
which denotes that the JCET program itself lacks the necessary evaluation process to 
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address the chronic problems and challenges encountered during the conduct of JCETs, 
ensure judicious use of money, and ensure proper return of training investment. 
The JCET Evaluation Framework (JEF) advanced in this study are validated and 
provide notable trends in the planning, execution, and evaluation of JCETs in the future. 
The first trend relates to the increasing number of US SOF members participating in 
Balance Pistons over the last five years; that is, USSOF is launching multiple teams to 
different areas or locations under the same JCET umbrella. In turn, this allows for an 
increased number of AFP training participants for a certain JCET. Another trend is that 
the AFP appears to be sending more of what this study has defined as the “correct units” 
to participate in JCETs. This trend focuses on nonoperational units that are cohesive, 
while further integrating the SOCOM schoolhouses during the training. The third trend is 
the emergence of combined post-training reviews. Only two examples of combined 
AARs existed, but they occurred in the last two years. It is inherently necessary that units 
inform each other on what they can improve so that they can change those things for the 
future. Another trend is the increase in the number of executed planned events. Not only 
were fewer events cancelled during the later JCETs, the reports also show that additional 
events were added throughout the engagements. This trend suggests that more skill sets 
are developed and enhanced during the JCET event. Lastly, the AFP’s intermittent issues 
and concerns in logistics directly impact the conduct of JCETs. The current AFP system 
is unresponsive when attempting to address the specific requirements of JCETs 
throughout the country.   
B. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Even though this study focused solely on U.S.-sponsored JCETs in the 
Philippines, the findings may prove to be generalizable to other U.S.-sponsored bilateral 
JCET programs. At the foresight, JCETs will continue to be used as a crucial SOF 
engagement tool with PNs due to its enduring investments in forging a relationship, and 
at the same time achieving the main objectives of training US SOF personnel in foreign 
countries. JCET activities provide an edge to boost the US SOF arsenal by its continued 
and persistent engagement, acquiring an unparalleled advantage in terms of operational 
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and cultural understanding and exposing its personnel to other aspects of security 
cooperation. There are challenges in the continuity of the JCETs, especially when there is 
no overall combined strategy from both sides. This includes a lack of shared vision for 
primarily utilizing JCETs to enhance USSOF teams’ mentoring and instructor skills, 
cultural awareness and understanding, and other skillsets inaccessible to US training 
facilities such as jungle training and survival. Another challenge is to enhance war 
fighting skills and the capability of PH SOF in addressing internal and external security 
threats. Therefore, this study recommends the following. 
1. Post-Training Report Standardized Format and Exchange  
This study concluded that it is important that both the PH and US executing 
agencies or organizations design a standard format of post-training reports and look for 
secured ways and means to exchange these reports. The purpose is obvious, as well as the 
objective of the exchange. Both parties need to know what had been achieved up to the 
current point, how and when to attain the shared goals, and what areas need more 
attention. JCETs should not mean business as usual, but rather they should be employed 
to signal the importance of security engagements not only in building partnerships but 
also in making those partnerships instrumental in achieving the broader aspects of 
security cooperation. By exchanging notes and giving honest feedback from concerned 
PH SOF and US SOF headquarters, the planners would have a better understanding to 
improve and achieve the objectives of JCETs. The dividends of this program are clear. 
Foremost, the interactions and exchanges will benefit both sides. Moreover, leaders and 
soldiers will acquire a different mindset that the highest form of cooperation and 
collaboration is done with a candid exchange of information or feedback, not only during 
training but also during actual combat coalition operations. It has been said that “victory 
in war starts in training,”108 but it would be more effective if leaders and soldiers not 
only train to learn but also learn to train and, more importantly, learn to exchange that 
learning in the most efficient way. 
                                                 
108 Cabahug, “SOF Joint Combine Exchange Training from a Host Nation’s Perspective.” 
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2. Develop a JCET Strategy  
Based on the collected post-JCET reports, it is evident that there is no strategy 
employed either by US SOF of PH SOF in optimizing the utilization of the JCET 
program. Without a solid plan of action for JCETs, the results of this exercise will be 
mediocre or suboptimal. Therefore, it is imperative to develop the right strategy for 
JCETs because at the end of the day, both parties are spending the taxpayer’s money. 
Philippine and US militaries are accountable to the people they both swear to serve. 
Having a sound strategy for JCETs would discard or negate the leftist or anti-US groups 
in spreading false allegations or charges against the use of public money by the military 
for expensive yet suboptimal training exercises. 
3. Improve Sustainment Operations 
The recurring concerns during any bilateral exercise such as BALIKATAN or 
JCETs is the slow and/or unresponsive logistic system of the AFP. Most of the bilateral 
exercises were affected by the untimely delivery of supplies and equipment (or perhaps 
lack of equipment), lack of standard training facilities, and non-availability of air or 
ground transport vehicles during the actual field training exercise. In short, too much 
bureaucracy coupled with a lack of attention in providing the much-needed training 
support impedes effectiveness and efficacy. This eventually results in a suboptimal 
training outcome or worse, a training fiasco. Sustainment operation must be exercised 
during the training so that it would be more effective or efficient during the actual 
conduct of combat operations. Therefore, the AFP in general or the PA in particular 
needs to enhance and align its logistic or sustainment system to cater the needs of its most 
important human resource—the soldiers. It is imperative that the soldiers are provided 
with substantial training and logistic support to realize the vision of the AFP in 
professionalizing the force. 
4. Include Alternate Participants for HR Vetting  
In order to maximize the training opportunities of the PN security force elements 
and optimize the value of the taxpayer’s money from both forces, PNs should include 
alternate participants in the HR Vetting process. Since the HR vetting process (90 days or 
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three months prior the exercise) is mandated by US law to all participants of security 
assistance and security cooperation like JCETs, PNs must comply—because of this, it 
would be wise to include alternates to avoid low personnel attendance during the training 
due to current or emerging operational demands, which is a priority over the training. 
This occurred in one particular JCET, which only trained 31 AFP participants.109 The 
APA originally planned for 65 AFP participants;110 however, due to ongoing operations 
the available training pool changed, and the time had expired to conduct HRV on soldiers 
not listed 90 days in advance.  
5. Conduct Effective Survey
Immediately following any bilateral training exercises such as JCETs, survey 
questions should be conducted to the planners, participants, opposing forces, training 
directorate, and logistics and training support teams to gather inputs, observations, 
comments, and recommendations on the conducted training events and the overall 
conduct of the JCET itself. The individual impression and evaluation of the conducted 
training is a realistic form of feedback that allows for JCET modification or innovation to 
better suit the circumstance where and when the exercise is to be conducted. A more 
accurate, reliable, and cost-effective means of getting feedback of a certain activity or 
program is to conduct an effective survey that must adhere to research-based and well-
established principles. Accurate and reliable surveys improve better organizational 
decision-making and better assessment of program needs, priorities, and performance.111 
Recommended survey questions must include feedback on training venue, logistical 
support, duration, effectiveness of POI, attainment of training goals, and quality of 
instructors (among others) that could further the research initiated in this study.   
109 Raabe (U) Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report, 1. 
110 Travis Milgrim (U) Administrative Procedures Agreement between ODA XXXX and Special 
Operations Command, Philippine Army (Department of Defense: Washington, D.C., 2013) 2. This 
document is classified FOUO. 
111 Walt Whitmer, Conducting Effective Surveys Means Knowing the ‘Rules of the Road’ (Economic 




C. FUTURE RESEARCH AND WAY AHEAD 
With the limited data about conducted JCETs, it would be relevant to conduct 
extensive research on this field because of the importance of JCETs in the overall 
conduct of US security cooperation. As this program continues to be conducted in the 
future, it would be worthy to examine the returns of JCETs in terms of training 
investment. It would not only justify the needed funding but would perhaps magnify or 
vividly illustrate the significance of this program in enhancing US troops’ instructor and 
mentoring skills, and acquire better awareness and understanding of PNs’ culture as well 
as in shaping or reshaping the PNs’ capacity and capability to be aligned with US 
security cooperation policy objectives. 
  
 63 
APPENDIX A. JCETS REGULARLY CONDUCTED IN THE 
PHILIPPINES 
(1) Vector Balance Piston  
Vector Balance Piston is a yearly PH-US Army-to-Army JCET, which focuses on 
enhancing the interoperability and capacity of both forces in counterterrorism (CT) and 
counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. US 1st Special Forces Group (A) and the former 
Philippine Army (PA) Light Reaction Battalion (LRB), which is upgraded into a Light 
Reaction Regiment (LRR) are the participating units for this particular JCET.112 To add 
complexity and reality in the frontline, the PNP SAF are regularly invited to participate in 
this exercise to specifically provide more on the law enforcement and document 
exploitation portions of the exercise. The PNP SAF also participates in the associated 
friendship jumps or military free fall training events.113 
(2) Balance Piston  
Balance Piston is a PH-US Army-to-Army JCET, which is conducted twice or 
thrice a year. This JCET is geared on enhancing the interoperability of both forces in war-
fighting skills to address internal threats and insurgency. BP training events include but 
are not limited to airborne operations, civil-military operations, day and night air 
operations, internal defense operation, information operations, live fire exercises, 
marksmanship training, medical or tactical combat casualty care training, maritime or 
riverine operations, small unit tactics, special reconnaissance and direct action, and 
unconventional warfare.114 Philippine Special Forces (SF) and Scout Rangers (SR) are 
the regular training participants for the PH side while the SOF Team or Teams from 
different US Army Special Forces Groups115 are the participating elements from the US 
                                                 
112 Stephen C. Cohn, Realignment of United States Forces in the Pacific: Why the U.S. Should Pursue 
Force Sustainment Training in the Republic of the Philippines (Monterey, CA: NPS Press, 2006), 71. 
113 Stukaph’s Weblog, U.S. Naval Special Warfare, NWU Type III—AOR 2 Camouflage Uniform on 
Assignment in the Philippines, accessed 21 September 2015, https://stukaph.wordpress.com/2011/01/22/. 
114 Cohn, Realignment of United States Forces in the Pacific, 70. 
115 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) is the main U.S. partner in these engagements, however 19th 
Special Forces Group (Airborne) has also participated in US/PH JCETs.  
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side. In order to expose field units to joint and combined training and exercise, division 
reconnaissance companies (most of the soldiers were SF and SR qualified) also 
participate as training participants for BP training exercises.  
(3) Teak Piston  
Teak Piston is a PH-US Air Force-to-Air Force JCET with emphasis on “low-
level flight navigation, infiltration, and air drops.”116 C-130 aircraft maintenance training 
is also included as part of the exercise. 
(4) Flash Piston  
Flash Piston is a PH-US Navy Seals JCET, which focuses on small unit tactics, 
marksmanship, and demolition, among others. Flash Piston incorporates trainings on 
maritime close quarter battle and jungle survival.117 Moreover, small boat operations, 
assault tactics, tactical combat medical care, and casualty evacuations were also included 
as part of the exercise.118 
(5) Lantern Piston 
Lantern Piston is a JCET traditionally participated by the PH and US Marines. 
However, in recent years the PNP SAF has also participated in this exercise. For 
example, Lantern Piston 13–3 is specifically designed to cater to the training demands of 
PNP SAF.119 
(6) Fusion Piston  
Fusion Piston is a joint-interagency JCET, which supports counterterrorism and 
counter-narcotics operations. The AFP and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency are 
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the lead agencies for this type of JCET. On the US side, the Drug Enforcement Agency 
and US Navy Seals participate in this bilateral training exercise.120 
(7) Baker Piston  
Baker Piston is a law enforcement JCET, which focuses on enhancing the 
effectiveness of Philippine counter-drug agencies to facilitate successful prosecution of 
drug-related offenders. The training events include but are not limited to advanced 
marksmanship, cordon and search, instructor training, medical training, mission planning, 
movement techniques, special reconnaissance, trail interdiction, and urban terrain small 
unit tactics, among others.121 
(8) Badge Piston  
Badge Piston is PH-US JCET participated by the PNP SAF and US SOF. It 
focuses on enhancing the capacity and capability of PNP SAF in hostage rescue, 
commando-type unconventional warfare, search and rescue, and other special operations 
with national and international implications.122 Training events include, but are not 
limited to, basic and advanced combat marksmanship, close quarter combat, medical 
training, and mission planning and execution.123  
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September 21, 2015, http://pnp.gov.ph/portal/index.php/press-news-releases/more-media-news/38-
regional/1446-pnp-maritime-group-officially-initiates-baker-piston-14-2-training-in-palawan. 
122 Philippine National Police (PNP) Special Action Force (SAF) website, Mission of PNP SAF, 
accessed September 21, 2015, http://pnp.gov.ph/portal/index.php/press-news-releases/more-media-
news/38-regional/1446-pnp-maritime-group-officially-initiates-baker-piston-14-2-training-in-palawan. 
123 PNP SAF Badge Piston Video Clip, accessed September 21, 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_5jXSTejL3U. 
 66 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 67 
APPENDIX B. CONSOLIDATED JCET DATA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Initial assessment criteria for this study included many predictors for success: 
cultural awareness, quality of advisors, planning, training venues, and time invested, as 
well as how the value of JCETs relate to the overall theater campaign plan. However, 
some of these criteria are near impossible to substantiate. The quality of advisors, 
although clearly a subjective variable, could possibly be determined if the post-training 
reports had discussed the individual trainers. The reports that were analyzed did not 
describe the quality of the advisors, neither PH nor United States. Therefore, advisor 
quality has been dismissed as a variable. The quality of training resources was an initial 
variable as well. However, just like the quality of instructors, there was not enough data 
to quantify the variable. Post-engagement writers were able to describe overwhelming 
flaws in resources, but failed to mention any positive comments, nor anything of 
importance in great detail regarding resources.  
JCETs, although designed for training of US operators, supports the Theater 
Campaign Plan (TCP) by enhancing the capabilities and inter-operability, while fostering 
good relations between the US and PH armies.124 This objective is listed in all of the 
reviewed post-training assessments and is a TCP priority directly linked to the National 
Security Strategy. In this sense, the incidental benefits gained by participating Partner 
Nations are of greater importance than the actual training benefits received by the 
executing US SOF unit.  
The Philippine Army (PA) Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in Fort 
Magsaysay, Nueva Ecija, Philippines and the Lessons Learned Office (LLO) at Joint 
Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM) are the main sources of these post-JCET reports. It should 
be noted, however, that records prior to the establishment of the LLO are difficult to 
acquire. Also, while some units are proactive in ensuring that the LLO receives valuable 
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training information, some units maintain the information locally. While consolidating 
the JCET information for this study, the LLO individually contacted the subordinate US 
SOF units and requested that the information be locally maintained.  
The data presented in this study is a consolidation of relevant facts from over 900 
pages of mostly classified documents. Only unclassified sources and unclassified sections 
of classified documents are referenced in this document. All source reference 
information, including report titles and authors, has been sterilized in order to preserve 
the classification of the sources. In an attempt to streamline the content of the main 
thesis, this information is located in the appendix and serves as a reference for the overall 
document.  
B. JCET QUALITATIVE INFORMATION 
1. JCET Event 1 
During Event 1, the combined participants conducted fellowship socials to 
develop camaraderie125 and jointly planned, coordinated, and executed two Civil Military 
Operations (CMO) activities126 (a MEDCAP and a VETCAP). The Filipino planners also 
coordinated with local corporate sponsors (McDonalds) for the conduct of the CMO 
activities.127 Overall, Event 1 involved 14 US Special Operations Force (SOF) and 57 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) participants128 and the training days totaled 12 
days.129  Training priorities were addressed for both nations and all units were satisfied 
with the overall training.130 However, more than two weeks of training were lost due to 
the delayed arrival of the US SOF (due to Typhoon Mina).131 A culmination exercise 
(CULEX) did not occur during Event 1. The AARs indicate that both sides viewed the 
training as a venue to share lessons learned and exchange tactics, techniques, and 
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procedures (TTPs) between each respective nation’s participating units;132 however, both 
the United States and the AFP noted in their respective AARs that the duration of the 
engagement was too short and failed to build strong rapport between the United States 
and AFP units.133 The AFP also noted that the training schedule was compressed to allow 
most events to be accomplished in the original allotted timeline, thus reducing what 
would have been great events.134   
The AFP participants were a composite unit assembled only for this event and a 
third of SR soldiers participating in the training were not actually Scout Ranger 
qualified.135 The combination of being a composite unit and the lack of SR experience 
severely slowed the training pace.136 Additionally, soldiers from the local PA Infantry 
division were integrated into training with the soldiers of the PA SF Battalion.137  
Although the United States and the AFP submitted unilaterally written AARs to 
their respective chains of command, the post-training reports showed no evidence of a 
conducted combined AAR by the participants.138 In these reports, the AFP complained 
about the need to rush training in the observation section of the report,139 yet the 
recommendations section states that they were still, overall, satisfied with the training.140 
For the US side, the participating US SOF did not feel as though the training was 
adequate and mentioned the need for a longer duration of training in its post- engagement 
report. Moreover, the US post-engagement report mentioned defective rifles and poor 
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136 Ibid. 
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equipment maintenance of the Filipino participants, which also consumed a considerable 
amount of training time to rectify.141  
2. JCET Event 2 
The number of active participants during this event was eight US SOF and 55 
AFP soldiers.142 The AFP participants consisted of a composite mix of PA Special 
Forces and Scout Ranger soldiers assigned to operational units, which greatly impeded 
the training.143 The total number of training days for Event 2 was 38 days.144 Event 2’s 
training schedule addressed the concerns for all parties145 and was constantly modified 
throughout execution due to training complications with the host battalion’s ongoing 
combat operations in the area.146 Also, a CULEX was properly coordinated and 
executed.147 During the JCET, the AFP led several training events: knot tying, survival, 
traps and snares, rope bridges, river crossing, and improvised cooking techniques.148 
Also, cultural exchanges frequently occurred during the engagement to include showing 
videos of PH and US respective Ranger and Special Forces units.149 All training records 
for Event 2 indicate that all planned training events were executed without any 
additions.150  
Although the United States and the AFP submitted unilaterally written AARs to 
their respective commands, the post-training reports showed no evidence of a combined 
AAR conducted by the participants.151 The AFP participants were, overall, satisfied with 
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the training.152 However, US SOF did not feel as though the training was adequate and 
recommended that US SOF partner with nonoperational AFP units during future 
engagements.153  
3. JCET Event 3 
The number of active participants during Event 3 was ten US SOF and 31 AFP 
soldiers.154 The participating AFP soldiers consisted of a cohesive unit, but due to 
ongoing operational demands, some personnel that should have benefitted from this 
JCET were unable to participate.155 No additional units beyond the single cohesive unit 
were involved in training during the JCET.156 The total number of training days for this 
event was 32 days.157 
A CULEX was planned and executed, but overall training did not address the 
concerns of the hosting AFP commander.158 The PA Special Forces battalion commander 
requested a focus on maritime operations (MAROPS), which was noted in the US SOF 
post-initial planning report and planned as two days for MAROPs tactics and planning, 
three days for beach landing site surveys and scout swimming, and one and a half days 
for a MAROPs infiltration practical exercise.159 However, the actual training during the 
JCET focused on combat marksmanship, devoting only a partial day to a MAROPs 
lecture.160 Furthermore, the AFP’s after training report only describes the U.S.-led 
training with no mention of the PH participants ever instructing,161 and neither the US 
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SOF post-engagement reports,162 nor the AFP post-training reports163 mention any 
cultural or rapport building events.   
Although the United States and the AFP submitted unilaterally written AARs to 
their respective commands, neither the US SOF post-training report164 nor the AFP post-
training report165 indicate that the participants conducted a combined AAR. Several 
events planned during the planning conference166 were not executed.167 Although US 
SOF considered the engagement a success,168 the AFP counterparts did not; the AFP 
desired to train more on MAROPs.169 
4. JCET Event 4 
The number of active participants during Event 4 was nine US SOF and 84 AFP 
soldiers170 and the total number of training days for this JCET was 47.171 According to 
reports, the training accommodated the needs of all participants,172 but a CULEX was not 
conducted and the training did not accommodate any unplanned events.173 Also, all 
participating units conducted a fellowship social to establish initial rapport early in the 
JCET.174 US SOF instructed AFP instructors from the PA Special Forces Company 
Refresher Training (CRT) Committee at the PA Special Forces School (SFS), who in turn 
instructed other AFP soldiers.175 The US SOF then assisted during CRT alongside a 
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nonoperational cohesive PA Special Forces Company.176 However, only a few CRT 
instructors participated in the JCET; insufficient numbers of CRT instructors participated 
in the preliminary training to see effects during the actual CRT rotational training.177  
Although the United States and the AFP submitted unilaterally written AARs to 
their respective commands, the post-training reports show no evidence that participants 
conducted a combined AAR.178 Also, training records for Event 4 indicate that all 
planned training events were executed without any additions.179 Furthermore, a 
discrepancy exists in that US SOF believed that the JCET was not quite a success, but 
would have been successful if more CRT instructors had participated.180 The PH 
participants claimed that Event 4 was a success.181  
5. JCET Event 5 
The number of active participants during Event 5 was 14 US SOF and 95 AFP 
soldiers182 and the JCET lasted for 19 days.183 The AFP participants consisted of 
complete PA Special Forces teams; however, they were in an operational status.184 No 
additional AFP units were involved in training.185 
According to documentation, the training accommodated the needs of all 
participants186 and was able to adjust in order to devote more time to prioritized 
events.187 However, the CULEX that was originally planned was not conducted due to 
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issues involving the local populace near the impact areas.188 Additionally, the reports 
state that the US SOF and AFP each instructed various events189 and the AFP reports 
specifically mention the importance, with regards to building added rapport, of having the 
US SOF stay at the camp near their AFP counterparts.190 Furthermore, the combined 
JCET participants jointly planned, coordinated, and executed a CMO project at a local 
school.191 The project was planned at the initial planning conference192 and allowed 
sufficient time to properly coordinate with the Local Government Unit (LGU). The level 
of rapport with the local government was so great that LGU allowed the JCET 
participants to utilize the government’s heavy equipment.193  
The available combined written AAR194 implies that a combined oral AAR was 
also conducted. Each participating unit submitted unilateral written AARs to their 
respective commands as well. Training records for Event 5 indicate that more events 
were added to training than were dropped. Although the CULEX was not conducted and 
a day of MAROPS training was cut, multiple days of pistol marksmanship were added, as 
well as a day of PH requested communications training.195 All participating parties 
claimed that the event was a success in their post-training reports.196  





192 Derek Kaiser (U) Administrative Procedures Agreement between ODA XXXX and Special 
Operations Command, Philippine Army (Department of Defense: Washington, D.C., 2013) 3. This 
document is classified FOUO. 
193 Reyes (U) Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report, 3. 
194 McDougal (U) PH-US Balance Piston XX-X Combined Post Training Report. 
195 Reyes (U) Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report, 2–3. 
196 Andrew McDougal (U) Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report (Department of Defense: 
Washington, D.C., 2013). This document is classified Secret.  
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6. JCET Event 6 
The number of active participants during Event 6 was six US SOF and 60 AFP 
soldiers197 and the total duration of training was 60 days.198 The AFP participants 
consisted of cohesive nonoperational units199 including soldiers from both the PA Special 
Forces School and the PA Special Forces Regiment.200 The planners had coordinated for 
Philippine Air Force (PAF) support, but the PAF cancelled at the last minute due to 
mission requirements.201  
Participating units conducted a fellowship dive to establish rapport.202 Also, a 
friendship jump was scheduled, but it was canceled due to adverse weather.203 The 
documents elude that the training fulfilled the needs of all participants, and flexibility in 
training execution was mentioned, which accommodated much-needed training events 
although resources available for the JCET changed. A CULEX was planned and 
conducted, but with some inefficacies in logistics.204 The US SOF and AFP each 
instructed various topics, shared TTPs, and imparted lessons learned.205 
Although the United States and the AFP submitted unilaterally written AARs to 
their respective commands, the post-training reports show no evidence of a conducted 
combined AAR by the participants.206 All parties involved viewed Event 6 as a 
success.207  
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7. JCET Event 7 
The number of active participants during Event 7 was 34 US SOF and 77 AFP 
soldiers.208 The AFP participants consisted of cohesive nonoperational units and 
instructors from the Special Forces School (SFS)209 and the total number of training days 
for this engagement was 26 days.210 Participating units conducted a friendship jump to 
establish rapport.211 Also, US SOF stayed at the school compound to build cohesion,212 
and all PH and US holidays were observed.213 According to reports, the training 
accommodated the needs of all participants214 and all planned events appeared to be 
executed.215  A CULEX was planned (and also included in the APA)216 and executed. 
Reports also noted that the US SOF and AFP each instructed various topics.217  
A combined written AAR is attached to the After Training Report, signifying 
open discussions between the units.218 Combined AARs appeared to be conducted 
regularly throughout the JCET. While the US SOF viewed Event 7 as a success,219 the 
AFP felt that the US SOF did not have a training schedule and almost exclusively 
focused on cross training themselves.220  
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8. JCET Event 8 
The number of active participants during Event 8 was 23 US SOF and 65 AFP 
soldiers.221 All participating units were internal to the Special Forces Regiment, which 
consisted of cohesive nonoperational units.222 The total number of training days for this 
engagement was 33 days.223 The documents portray that the training accommodated the 
needs of all participants, and a CULEX was planned and executed.224 Also, participating 
units conducted a friendship jump, an unspecified cultural visit, and a boodle fight to 
establish and strengthen rapport.225 Further strengthening the cultural bond, the US SOF 
and AFP each instructed various topics throughout the JCET.226  
A combined Oral AAR was listed in the training calendar.227 There was no 
evidence of a combined written AAR; all participating parties submitted unilateral AARs 
to their respective commands. The after training reports suggest that the events planned 
were the same as the events that were executed228 and all parties involved viewed Event 
8 as a success.229  
9. JCET Event 9 
The total number of participants during this engagement was 193 US SOF and 
268 combined AFP soldiers and PNP officers230 and the total number of training days for 
this event was 25.231 For US SOF, these numbers include US Army rotary wing 
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personnel and US Air Force Airman. The AFP participants consisted of cohesive 
nonoperational units and instructors from the training directorate.232 Participating units 
included the LRR, the Joint Special Operations Group (JSOG), the 205th Helo Wing, 
local PNP, and the PNP-SAF.233 The training accommodated the needs of all participants 
and a CULEX was planned and executed.234 The reports note that the US SOF and AFP 
each instructed various topics.235 Also, participating units conducted a friendship jump 
and an icebreaker social.236 
A combined oral AAR is listed in the training calendar,237 but there is no 
evidence of a combined written AAR. The United States and the AFP submitted 
unilaterally written AARs to their respective commands. The post-engagement reports 
indicate that events that were executed were the same as those that had been planned238 
and all parties involved viewed Event 9 as a success.239 Note that Event 9 will not be 
included in the following chart. This event is the only Vector Balance Piston that this 
study addresses and will skew the data. 
C. VISUAL REPRESENTATION OF JCET DATA 
Table 2 illustrates some of the easily quantifiable facts from the eight JCETs: 
number of personnel (both US SOF and AFP) and the duration of the events from 
opening ceremonies to closing ceremonies (not including set-up or clean-up days). It also 
displays whether or not a combined AAR was conducted with representatives of all 
participating units together. Only two out of the eight JCETs conducted combined AARs.  
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Table 2.   JCET Quantifiable Data and Notation of Combined AARs 
Conducted vs. Not Conducted by Event 
Event 
# US 





1 14 57 12 N 
2 8 55 38 N 
3 10 31 32 N 
4 9 84 47 N 
5 14 95 19 Y 
6 6 60 60 N 
7 34 77 26 Y 
8 23 65 33 N 
 
Table 3 highlights the types of AFP units that trained during each respective 
JCET. If another unit participated outside of the hosting battalion, then that exercise 
receives a “Y” for “yes” in the column. The AFP units are also annotated on whether they 
were in an operational status during the event, it the units were a cohesive (Y) group or a 
composite (N), and whether or not the JCET integrated PA SOCOM school instructors.  
Table 3.   Data Depicting Types of AFP Units Trained During Studied 
JCETs 
Event Multiple Units 
Integrated 








1 Y N N N 
2 Y N N N 
3 N N N Y 
4 Y Y Y Y 
5 N N N Y 
6 Y N Y Y 
7 Y Y Y Y 




Table 4 displays data related to flexibility of training schedules, CULEX 
execution, and adherence to the agreed-upon training schedules.  
Table 4.   Data Depicting Variation in Planned vs. Executed Events During 
Studied JCETs 
Event Executed All Planned 
Events 
Adjusted Schedule to meet 
AFP SOF needs 
Executed 
CULEX 
1 N N N 
2 Y Y Y 
3 Y N Y 
4 Y N N 
5 Y Y N 
6 N Y Y 
7 Y N Y 
8 Y N Y 
 
 
Finally, Table 5 compares US and PH comments related to success in the 
respective post-engagement reports. In order to be viewed as a success, the report 
contained a preponderance of positive comments related to the training. On the contrary, 
non-successful reports contained multiple negative comments regarding the training 
during the JCETs.  
Table 5.   Data Depicting Discrepancies between US and PH Views of 
Success Per JCET 
Event US Viewed JCET as a 
Success 
AFP Viewed JCET as 
Success 
1 N Y 
2 N Y 
3 Y N 
4 N Y 
5 Y Y 
6 Y Y 
7 Y N 
8 Y Y 
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